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ORIGINAL INTENT: THE JuDIcIAL USES OF HISTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN AUsTRALIA AND THE
UNITED STATES
Stephen A. James*
The search for certainty, consistency and neutrality in constitutional interpreta-
tion has led some commentators and judges (if we accept the sincerity of their ex-
planations) to embrace the "original understanding" of a constitution as a supposed
bulwark against a tide of "unprincipled," undemocratic (democracy conceived of in
majoritarian terms), subjective, indeterminate, and "politicized" judicial activism
and "law-making." They treat the intentions of the framers with respect to the
meanings of the words in the text they created as dispositive of questions of con-
stitutional interpretation and adjudication. They are the so-called "originalists"
whose reverence for the "minds" of the framers is matched only by their scorn for
those "liberal academics" and others who argue that a constitution is not limited to
the past, though it has roots there, but is living, adaptable and in need of constant
understanding and affirmation by the people whose lives it affects in the present.
The Australian and American polities and legal systems share much in com-
mon (although there are also significant differences as we shall see): both are for-
mer English colonies, both have written constitutions (and of course, the Australian
one drew heavily on the American model), both have systems of representative
government, both have federal systems, share a common law heritage and practice,
and have entrusted the ultimate power of constitutional interpretation to supreme
courts.
This article explores another feature currently common in both countries
(although to a much greater extent in the U.S.): popular, academic and judicial con-
troversy over the use of historical evidence in constitutional interpretation and the
legitimacy of judicial review and "law-making." More specifically, this article
seeks to discover how history has been judicially used in constitutional interpreta-
tion in the U.S.A. and Australia at the national level, what has been seen as the le-
gitimate extent of its use and how the High Court of Australia, only now embarking
on both a more explicitly political and historical role, can learn from debates over
original intent in the U.S.A. over the last decade. In relation to the U.S., and then
Australia, the article asks two main questions of originalism: can we readily ascer-
tain original intent? And, if so, is it in principle the best form of constitutional in-
terpretation? The conclusion is that originalism is inconsistent, impracticable and
no more democratic than alternative approaches. But this conclusion does not pre-
clude the judicial consideration of historical evidence in constitutional cases. Rath-
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er, such evidence (including the framers' "intentions" to the extent that these can
be ascertained or (re-) constructed with any certainty) is a valid part of the social
data necessary for any constitutional judgement which must resolve human dis-
putes. Further, history can illuminate the purpose and fundamental principles of a
constitution, and provide a degree of political and legal consistency.
After demonstrating that judges in both countries already construe the Con-
stitutional text in the light of constitutional principles thought to be implied by it
(for instance, republicanism - in the case of the U.S.A. - constitutionalism, rep-
resentative democracy, federalism, nationhood, parliamentary sovereignty - in the
case of Australia - and judicial review), the article calls on judges to make public,
explicit, coherent and democratic justification for those principles. The article con-
cludes by outlining and illustrating (in reference to Australia) a text-constrained,
but democratic and constitutionalist theory of constitutional interpretation, which
can enable constitutional interpreters to answer those calls. Judges cannot justify
constitutional interpretations and adjudications on the basis of oracular voices from
the past: they cannot but speak with their own voices to an audience in the present.
It is to this audience that judges owe their constitutional duty of principled inter-
pretation.
Upon being sworn in as Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia in 1952
Sir Owen Dixon declared that
close adherence to legal reasoning is the only way to maintain the confi-
dence of all parties in Federal Conflicts. It may be that the Court is
thought excessively legalistic. I should be sorry to think that it is anything
else. There is no other safe guide to judicial decisions in great conflicts
than a strict and complete legalism.'
But how could such a strict and complete legalism, intended to blinker if not
blindfold a judge against the temptations of public policy-making or personal moral
or political judgements provide a safe guide along the tortuous paths of historical
analysis and political and moral philosophy? Further, these are paths which a judge
cannot avoid proceeding down when interpreting an avowedly political document
such as a constitution. The schizophrenia of the High Court of Australia exhibits
itself in an enthusiasm for policy-making dependent upon general principles sup-
posedly inherent in the constitutional framework and its historical development,
combined with a reluctance to elucidate and justify those principles or to consult
primary historical materials. Happily, this naive philosophy and textbook history
now has at least one opponent within the High Court itself. In 1986, Sir Anthony
Mason reminded judges that
it is impossible to interpret any instrument, let alone a constitution, di-
vorced from values. To the extent that they are taken into account, they
should be acknowledged and should be accepted community values rather
than mere personal values. The very present danger is that 'strict and
complete legalism' will be a cloak for undisclosed and unidentified policy
values.2
.Reported in 85 C.LR. xi, at xiii-xiv (1952), quoted in Sir Anthony Mason, The Role of a Constitutional
Court in a Federation A Comparison of the Australian and the United States Experience, 16 FED. L RBV. 4
(1986).
2 Id. at 5. Sir Anthony Mason went on later in the article to argue as follows: "The objection usually
made to the use of the [Australian] Convention debates is that we have no means of knowing whether the
remarks of a particular speaker commanded assent of the majority. The objection is not universally true
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The traditional English approach to statutory interpretation - followed strict-
ly, at least in formal terms, by the Australian High Court until very recently - has
at times been just such a cloak, as Dr. Brian Galligan's study Politics of the High
Court (1987)' substantiates. Classical English doctrine required judges to deter-
mine the meaning of words in a statute with as little resort as possible to so-called
extrinsic materials (e.g. historical evidence, economic effects, political conse-
quences). By contrast, the United States Supreme Court has long held legitimate
constant reference to extrinsic historical materials. For "originalists," the point of
referring to these materials is to ascertain the original intention of the Framers (a
term I will use as shorthand throughout the article although realizing how prob-
lematic it is to determine exactly whose views are to count as authoritative in con-
stitutional interpretation) of the Constitution in using the words they did in 1787.
Originalists hold this original understanding to be decisively authoritative, taking
precedence over the meaning the Constitution has taken on as it has been inter-
preted and applied over the centuries.
The "originalist" approach to the constitution has been the subject of lively de-
bate in the U.S., 4 partly at least because under the aegis of the Reagan administra-
and, even if it were true, it is a very slender reason for refusing to take account of the comments of the
founders in the course of their deliberations on drafts of the Constitution."
One speaker may provide an unexpected insight or explain why a particular draft was not accepted.
What is more the debates are a primary source of material for commentaries by experts which the Court
does not hesitate to use as an aid to interpretation" Id. at 25-26. Sir Daryl Dawson (currently on the
bench) has also recently signalled the possibility of historical examination by the High Court of Australia
- albeit of a quasi-originalist kid:
I do not think that it has ever been overtly suggested here, as it has in the United States, that it is
permissible to adopt a construction which demonstrably is one which those who framed the docu-
ment did not intend. We do allow the objective intention of the founding fathers, as revealed by the
text, to govern our construction of the Constitution ... Even if an intent is not revealed by the text,
we may seek to find a form of intent outside the constitution by making an historical examination
of the purpose of a particular provision.
See Sir D. Dawson, Intention and the Constitution - Whose Intent? (the Third Annual Sir Leo Cussen
Memorial Lecture delivered at Melbourne on 11 November 1988), 6 Ausm. BAR Rviaw 100 (1990). See
also G. Brennan J. (a Justice of the High Court), Courts, Democracy and the Law, 65 Ausm. L. 32
.(1991).
3 B. GALLaoAN, PoLrrcs OF TieM HiH COURT. A STUDY OF Tm JuDIciAL BRANcH OF GovRNmer IN AusniA
(Ringwood, Vic.: Penguin, 2nd. ed. 1989), Ch. 1,passim.
" See, e.g., D.A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Owo ST. IU. 1085-1106
(1989); LW. Ley, OpnnrAL ImENeT An THs FRAMMs' CONSTUrION (New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company, 1988); M.1. Perry, The Authority of TexA Tradition and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional In-
terpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. Rav. 551 (1985); W.B. Michaels, Response to Perry and Simon, 58 S. CAt. L.
REv. 673 (1985); C.A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 5 CoNsr. CoMMENTARY 77
(Winter 1987-88); E. Meese EIl, The Attorney General's View of the Supreme Court: Toward a Jurispru-
dence of Original Intent, 45 PUB. ADMN. Rrv. 701 (1985); W.F. Murphy, Constitutional Interpretation:
The Art of the Historian, Magician, or Statesman?, 87 YALE LEJ. 1752 (1978); P. Brest, The Misconceived
Questfor Original Understanding 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204 (1980); M. DuMoND,Democracy and The Federal-
ist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Inten 53 A. PoL. Sc. Rrv. 52 (1959); W.H. Rehnquist, The No-
tion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tax L. Rev. 693 (1976); J. Woodford, The Blinding Light: Uses of
History in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 31 U. CHn. L. Retv. 502 (1964); S.R. Munzer et. el. Does the Con-
stitution Mean What It Always Meant? 77 CoL U. Rev. 355 (1988); William Brennan, 1, The Constitution
of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L.J. 433 (1986); C. Fried, SonnetLXVand the
"BlackInk' of the Framers Intention, 100 HARv. L. Rav. 751 (1987); Simon, The Authority of the Framers
of the Constitution: Can Originalst Interpretation Be Justfied?, 73 CAL. L. Rav. 1482 (1985); H.J. Po-
well, The Original Understanding of OriginalIntent, 98 HARv. L. Ruv. 885 (1985). See also the references
listed in the footnotes of Dr. James Thomson's article - Constitutional Interpretation: History and the
High Court: A Bibliographical Survey, 5 U.N.S.W. L.J. 313-323 (1982A), especially notes 38, 60, 63.
Since the first writing of this article, the following relevant publications have appeared: JJ. Gibbons, In-
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tion, and thenceforth in its shadow, it has been seen by judges like William
Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia of the Supreme Court, and "near-appointee" Robert
Bork, as legitimating a conservative rearguard action against the "non-
interpretivist," "liberal" judicial activism of the Warren Court in the 1950's and
1960's.
Ironically, in Australia - if the issue is even debated5 - the possibility of
deriving the original intent from judicially considered historical evidence is thought
by the legal fraternity to have radical rather than conservative implications.6 De-
spite the general acceptance among Australian jurisprudents that judges make law
and do not simply declare it, the notion of the judge as historian or social theorist
can still make many a traditional judge or lawyer blanch as she recalls what is for
her the specter of a Justice Lionel Murphy or Lord Denning. Both these judges -
Murphy on the High Court of Australia, Denning as a Law Lord and Master of the
Rolls - were, for all the differences in their background and ideology, judicial
iconoclasts who were more than usually frank about the need for judicial activism
and law-making, and the eschewing of stare decisis when it seemed to stand in the
way of their admittedly very different personal visions of justice (Murphy's "radi-
cal" social democracy, Denning's "classical" civil liberties). Both judges also pro-
voked controversy in political, professional (as frequent dissenters on the bench,
and with their lack of reverence for precedent) and public arenas to an
unprecedented extent in the Anglo-Australian judicial world."
Recent trends in the High Court and new legislation promoting judicial re-
course to a wider range of materials in interpreting statutes (notably § 15AB of the
Cth. Acts Interpretation Act (1901)) promise that the role of history in constitution-
al interpretation will become a lively issue. Questions such as whether judges
tentionalism, History and Legitimacy, 140 U. PA. L. Rsv. 613-645 (1991); J.A. Gardner, The Positivist
Foundations of Originalism: an Accountand Critique, 71 B.U. L Rov. 1-45 (1991); E. Cook, The Tempta-
ion and Fall of Original Understanding DUKE LL 1163-206 (1990); H.W. Baade, Original Intent, in
Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 Tax. L. RLv. 1001-107 (1991); D.M. O'Brien, The
Framers' Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Cour and Pragmatic Constitutional Interpretivsm, 8
CNsr. CoMEmrrARY 119-48 (1991); G.L. Neuman, Whose Constitution? 100 YALE .. 909-91 (1991);
R.H. BORK, THE TEmPTN OF AMucA: TE PoLmcAL SEDUCTON OF TIm LAw (New York: The Free Press,
1990) (noted HARv. J. L AND Pus. Po.. Vol. 14, no. 1, 225); S. Freeman, OriginalMeaning, Democratic
Interpretation and the Constitution, 21(1) PmIosopHy AND Pusuc AFFAIRS (1992) 3-42.
5 Compared with the torrents of ink that have flowed because of this issue in the U.S.A., the Australian
discussion has amounted to a mere trickle. See J.A. Thomson (1982) id. See also JA. Thomson, Princi-
ples and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation and Adjudication: Some Preliminary Notes, 13 M 8.
BouRNE U. L. Ray. 597 (1982B); H. Burmester, The Convention Debates and the Interpretation of the
Constitution in G. CRAvEN (ED.), THm CoNvEmnoN DEEI.Ts 1891-1898: COMMNTARIES, INDICES AND GUIDE
(Sydney: Legal Books, 1986), Vol. 6 at 25-39; LJ.M. Cooray and S. Ratnapala, The High Court and the
Constitution - Literalism and Beyond in G. Craven supra, at 203-225; M. Copsa, ENcOUMRrs Wrm THE
AUSTRALIAN CoNsrnrTmoN (N.S.W.: CCH, 1987), at 400-422; Mason supra note 1; Dawson supra note 2;
Galligan, supra note 3; P. Brazil, Legislative History, Statutes and Constitution, 4 U. QLr. L. 1 (1961);
P.M. McDermott External Affairs and Treaties - the Founding Fathers' Perspective, 16 U. Qw. LI.
123-136 (1990); Mi. D~rioLD, THE AusnAITA COmmONwEALTH: A FUNDA ENAL ANALYSIS OF rrs
CoNSMT=nON (Melbourne: Law Book Co., 1985).
' See, eg., P. Bickovskii,_No Deliberate Innovators: Mr. Justice Murphy and theAustralian Constitution,
8 Fao.LRav. 460 (1977).
7 On Murphy J., see also JA. Scurr (an.), LoNELMuRPHY A RADICAL JUDGE (Melbourne: McCulloch/Mac-
milan, 1987; J. ELY AND R. ELY (Ens.), LIONLMuRPHY - TUB RULE OF LAw (Sydney: Akron Press, 1986);
A.R. BLACKSHIEW, ur AS. (EDs.), THE JUDGMErs OF JUSnCE LIONEL MURPw (Sydney: Primavera Press,
1986). On Denning L., see S. LE, UDnnio JUDGES (London: Faber & Faber, 1988), Ch. 17; J.L JoWELL,
ETAL. (EDs.), LORD DENN No: THE JUDGE AND THE LAW (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1984); P. RoBsoN, et al.
(EDs.), JusncE LORD DENNING AND THE CoNSITrON (Gower. Hants, 1981).
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should be historians, what methods they should use, and whether the intentions of
the Framers should be controlling in constitutional interpretation should become
smoldering if not burning ones over the next few years. The answers one gives to
these questions will significantly influence how democratically and flexibly the
Constitution will operate.
The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has been more openly political than the
Australian High Court and has "unashamedly" referred to a wide range of extrinsic
historical materials is consistent with the eighteenth-century natural rights philoso-
phy which was used to justify the revolution against the tyranny of the British
Crown and Parliament. The essentially liberal creed subscribed to by the Framers
involved a suspicion of governmental power, and a belief in the need to limit it,
buttressed by a defence of individual liberty and property rights." To this end, the
U.S. Constitution limits and defuses federal government power by means of a strict
separation of executive, legislature and judiciary, a bi-cameral legislature, a federal
system, and a written Bill of Rights.
The American Revolution was significantly a revolution against parliamentary
sovereignty, and also to some extent paved the way for an indigenous legal culture
that was more antagonistic to strict legal positivism and stare decisis than En-
gland's. This natural law tradition, the highly normative quality of much of the
Constitution's language, the sacredness of the Constitution for many in the U.S.
polity, and the reverence for its framers are all factors which help to explain the
Supreme Court's less deferential attitude towards the legislature and its use of his-
torical materials in judicial review.
Following Professor Daniel Farber, we may define originalists as those con-
stitutional interpreters "committed to the view that original intent is not only rele-
vant but authoritative, that we are in some sense obligated to follow the intent of
the framers."9 As with any school of thought there are extremists and moderates
among originalists: the former holding that only original intent is relevant, and that
whoever wins on historical evidence should win the case; the latter that other fac-
tors may be significant, especially where original intent cannot easily be deter-
mined. There are also differences among originalists about the level of generality
at which to approach original intent. Are we to focus on the framers' general prin-
ciples? Their specific intent with regard to particular words or government ma-
chinery? Or linguistic conventions? But certainly a prerequisite to join the
originalist club must be acceptance by the interpreter that, as Farber says, "clear
evidence of original intent is controlling on any 'open' question of constitutional
law.
,' 0
For non-originalists the framers' intentions are not decisive in questions of
constitutional interpretation. "Aspirationalists," as they have been called in the
U.S., remind judges that it is a Constitution we are interpreting, not simply a liter-
ary text. It is a document which constitutes a polity in a particular way, seeking to
erect some boundaries within which laws made under its authority must stay in or-
der to be "constitutional."
1 B. BAILYN, THm IDEoLoIcAL ORIGNs OF TmE AMERICAN R.VOUIION (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap
Press, Harvard University Press, 1967), especially Chs. IH see also V; RR. PAutmR, Tm Ao oF HE DEmo-
cRxnc REVOLUroN, A PouncAL HISORY OF EuRops AND AE mucA, 1760-1800, Vol. 1, TH CHAUEGE
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), Ch. VIH; E.S. MoRGAN, THm BmmT OF mrm R EPtuC 1763-89
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1977 [Revd. ed.]), especially Ch. V.
' Farber, supra note 4, at 1086.
10 Id.
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Can we readily ascertain original intent? And, if so, is it in principle the best
form of constitutional interpretation?
In pursuing answers to the first question one comes across many obstacles. Of-
ten the Framers have not even turned their minds, at least as revealed in print or
connected to their reality, to the issues currently before the U.S. Supreme Court:
for example, pornography, affirmative action, surrogate motherhood, test tube ba-
bies, electronic surveillance, cable television, genetic engineering, sex changes or
insider trading. Where the Framers have discussed an issue of relevance to the
resolution of a current constitutional case, we have only the text of the Constitution
and James Madison's notes on the Convention debates, not published until 1840, to
guide us. Extensive studies by American Constitutional historians James Hutson
and Leonard Levy show that Madison's notes are highly abbreviated (missing much
more than half of what was said), and sanitized. He improved his own speeches
and exaggerated his own role in the constitutional Convention." Records for the
State ratifying conventions are even less reliable.'2 Similarly, those records for the
Bill of Rights debate fared no better, being left to the pro-Federalist Thomas Lloyd
who, according to Levy, "seems to have resorted more to imagination than to un-
derstanding because his deficient technique of note-taking was aggravated by
drunkenness.' 3
In any case, who do we mean when we say "the Framers" or "the Ratifiers"?
When talking about "the Framers" do we mean the fifty-five who were delegates at
Philadelphia, merely the thirty-nine who signed or the less than half that number
who participated in drafting committees? What about the significant influence of
some non-signatories present at debates? There were over 1,600 men who attended
the State ratifying conventions - whose intent is to prevail? 4 The determination
of subjective intent from documentary evidence is difficult enough, but the task of
aggregating into a "collective mind" views of a diverse group of individuals who
often had significant disagreements is (with apologies to Dworkin) positively Her-
culean. Levy concludes that
[o]riginal intent is an unreliable concept because it assumes the existence
of one intent on a particular issue... The entity we call "the Framers" did
not have a collective mind, think in one groove, or possess the same con-
victions.' 5
A tragic irony for originalists is that what evidence of the Framers' intent there
is shows that they did not intend their own intentions to have any binding authorita-
tive value for future interpreters of the words in the Constitutional text they had
created.' 6 Professor Powell1 7 has established that the Framers regarded "intent" as
referring to the supposedly objective meaning of the language used in the text, not
the subjective intentions of its authors. The notion that judges could use history
" J.H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65(1) Tox. L
REv. 1. especially at 35-39; Levy, supra note 4.2 Levy, supra note 4, at 288-291.
" Levy, supra note 4, at 293.
" Levy, supra note 4, at 295.
5 Levy, supra note 4, at 294.
6 A further irony concerning the originalists - considering their anxiety about judicial activism, and
their positivistic bent - is that their interpretive theory ends up being anti-textual: the text is a mere lens
through which one can see the authoritative constitutional source, the intent of the Framers and/or
Ratifiers.
"7 Powell, supra note 4, at 937-38.
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rather than the ordinary common law rules for statutory construction was viewed
with great suspicion by Madison and other chief draftsmen. For the Framers, to-
day's conservative originalists would be seen as innovators and judicial activists!
Of course, the Framers recognized that the Constitution was no ordinary stat-
ute: it was a document intended to endure and to be interpreted liberally and flexi-
bly rather than narrowly and pedantically. The Constitution was to be a tree of a
certain kind to be sure, and interpretation could not legitimately change this, but it
was a living tree nevertheless whose branches could grow in many directions from
generation to generation (the declaration in the Ninth Amendment that "The enu-
meration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people" supports this view). But where the text was
unclear on its face the Framers did not urge that the interpreter follow their in-
tentions as revealed in the Convention debates. The authority of the U.S. Constitu-
tion came from "We the People of the United States" - the ratifiers who had
adopted the text rather than the intentions of the framers whose ideas were not even
generally known in 1789."
Original intent cannot therefore have the specific and decisively authoritative
role in constitutional interpretation its supporters would like it to have. But one
would think that genuine historical analysis could help elucidate the meanings of
words used in the text so that the Supreme Court could maintain fidelity (or, as
Dworkin would call it, "integrity") 9 at a broad level to the kind of polity the Con-
stitution sought to create - for example, fidelity to the notion of democratic
republicanism or federalism. However, courts in the adversarial tradition are not
the best environments, nor lawyers and judges the best-equipped personnel, to take
on the role of the professional historian. Complete historical understanding does
not deliver up to the Court ready-made answers to a particular dispute: but lawyers
have never let the facts get in the way of a good argument, and judges must decide
a case and, inevitably opt for one party's lopsided view of the past over another's.
Lawyers and judges tend to use history in Orwellian fashion to argue for a particu-
lar result. Levy's study of the Supreme Court reveals that it has, in a succession of
cases (including Brown v. Board of Education2° and Roe v. Wade 1) "invited two
sides to cook the facts on a question of original intent" and then resorted to history
for "a quick fix, a substantiation, a confirmation, an illustration or a grace note."
It used history to rationalize results reached on other grounds of principle or policy.
It had neither the time, resources, expertise or will for a disinterested search for his-
torical evidence which would convince it to decide a case in one way or another.
The originalists attempted counterrevolution does not seem practicable. Instead,
my theory of constitutional interpretation, introduced later, will argue that although
historical evidence ought not to be controlling in constitutional readings, the high-
est courts can and indeed should be able to take this evidence into account (indeed
since the common law judicial process is inherently retrospective, at least in part, it
cannot help but undertake historical analysis to some degree).
I As Professor Father says, "It seems somewhat unlikely that the intent of the Scriveners was thought to
be binding on the ratifiers, especially when the Framers were so careful to keep the proceedings of the
Convention secret from the ratifiers themselves," Farber, supra note 4, at 1091.
-R.DwoRjN, Lw's Dams (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1986), especially Chs. 6,7.
2 0Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S. 483 (1953) (deciding that there should be desegrega-
tion of blacks and whites in public schools).
1 Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (founding a woman's right to abortion).
2 Levy, supra note 4, at 311, 322.
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But, assuming for the sake of argument that we can readily derive original in-
tent, is it the model we want for constitutional interpretation? At this stage, I want
only to give a lightning sketch of the normative arguments for and against original-
ism.' There are three main arguments in support of originalism: that legitimate
authority in a democracy comes from majority rule; that the proper judicial role is
to interpret texts via authorial intention; and that there are no principled alterna-
tives. To the first argument, we may question whether democratic majoritarianism
is indeed the grundnorm of the U.S. polity rather than, say, a natural law philoso-
phy of equal human rights. We may also ask why the present generation of con-
stitutional interpreters ought to be bound by the (largely) hypothetical consent of
ratifiers in the eighteenth century.' Where, for instance, were blacks and women
when the Constitution was adopted? In the Lockean tradition, the Framers sought
continual renewal of allegiance to the Constitution as a part of civic virtue as a
good republican. Citizens would have to be vigilant to determine whether the leg-
islature and government were keeping their side of the supposed social contract.
We can further cast doubt on the assertion that a legislature is necessarilly a more
democratic institution than a court. An argument can at least be made out that
courts are in many circumstances more insulated from the direct, corrupting in-
fluences of party politics and the deals struck in the special interest State.'
To the second argument, we may note that the Constitution embodies funda-
mental law authorizing all other laws. It can be argued further, as do deconstruc-
tionists, that the reader's understanding of a text, as well as her own context, is
equally or more important than the meaning its author hoped it would impart.2" Fi-
" Farber, supra note 4, at 1097-1103.
24 For arguments against this "hypothetical voluntarism" in social contract theory, see C. PATuEAN, T
PROBLEM OFPOLXICALOBUOAONA CRQuOF LiBERALTso.y (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), Chs. 5, 6,
7passim.
' For an argument that courts should be the preferred forums for resolving questions of "principle" see .
DwoRuN, A MNTm oF PmNCiPL (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985). An alternative,
process-based argument in favour of courts as democratic institutions is provided by John Hart Ely. Ac-
cording to Ely, judicial review is justified if it is necessary to reinforce representative democracy by keep-
ing political channels of participation, communication and change open, or to protect a minority against
denial by a hostile and discriminatory majority of its equal place in the political system, J.H. ELY, DEMoc.
RAcy AND Dsmiusr. A TEORY OF JuDiciALRnvmw (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986) at
103. See also P. Dworkin, Equality, Democracy, and Constitution: We The People in Court, XXVIH (No.
2) ALBERTAL. Rav. 324 (1990) (attacking the "statistical" and purely majoritarian conception of democra-
cy compared with a constitutional and communal one).
' The role of the reader and her or his context, and of the text and its own embeddedness in the particular
and general circumstances of its creation (both subjective -the state of mind and intentions of the author
-and objective; that is, the economic, political and social circumstances at the time of writing), in ideolo-
gy, and in tradition, is central to all hermeneutic (including deconstructionist) approaches to reading and
understanding a work. Here is not the place to attempt to develop these hermeneutic notions fully. The
chief insights of modem hermeneutics are encapsulated in the metaphor of the "hermeneutic circle": de-
scribingboth a methodological device in interpretation which considers a whole in relation to its parts and
vice versa (attempts must be made in reading to determine the meaning of words in terms of the sentences
of which they are a part, and the sentences in terms of the work as a whole placed within its linguistic and
literary context; the whole must be understood in terms of the smaller parts which together compose it; a
projection of the meaning of a text must be made in order to understand the parts one reads on the way to
its completion)-as in the Biblical exegesis of Luther and the grammatological techniques of the Roman-
tic hermeneuts like Schleiermacher and Dilthey - and, further, the way in which all interpretations are
encased in or encircled by a communality that binds us to tradition and to apre-interpretive understanding
of ourselves as beings.
This latter existential element is the thread which links Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer as theorists,
and explains their acceptance of interpretation as an unfolding of the primordial being of humans
(Dasein). Interpretation is always preceded by "understanding" (Verstehen - self-understanding, empa-
VoL.X1I
Spring 1992 Original Intent
nally, it will be argued, with Farber, that there are principled alternatives to origi-
nalism.
Adherence to the doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty and legalism has
meant that the High Court of Australia has not taken as activist a role as the U.S.
Supreme Court. Given the longer continuity of Australia's place within the British
Empire, and latterly the Commonwealth, it is not surprising that Australian courts
exhibit a greater reverence for stare decisis and for the rule of the legislature than
those in the U.S.A.27
It has often been noted by historians, social scientists and lawyers alike that in
Australia the Imperial State preceded and supervised the creation of the polity and
legal system. The government has largely been viewed by Australians not so much
with fear and suspicion as with expediency. Federation meant more uniform and
efficient government, not less government. Ever since, the State has been regarded
as "one vast public utility," in the words of Hancock.s The enactment of the Aus-
tralian Constitution was preceded by a Federation movement (from the early 1 880s
to 1900) which sought to unite the then existing self-governing colonies which had
thy, intuition, imagination and feeling rather than empirical or calculative knowledge which is somehow
"external") because, in Heidegger's ringing dicta "We understand as we do because we exist as we do,"
"Understanding follows Being" and "Language is the House of Being." For introductions to herneneutics
see: JM. CONNOLLY Am T. Ksrmm eds., Hsa crns v. Scmscs? Tmw GEsmAw vmws (Notre Dame,
Ind.:University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); J. BLuucuR, Co'TEaoRARovHumm cncS (Boston: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1980); L WmNsummRa, GA ra'sH a mcs.ARaEAnio oFTRtrH, A4 ME-OD (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
For a summary and analysis of Jurgen Habermas' critique of Gadamerian hermeneutics, see T. McCART-
HY, THE CRmcAL THEORY OF JURoEN HaBERMAS (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), Ch. 3, especially at
162-193. On critical theory in general, see D. Haw, INTRODUcON TO CRITcAL THEORY: HoRKHEIMER TO
HA m.uAs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). For a critical analysis of U.S. constitutional
law, see M. Tbsmsrr, REn, Wrr AND BLUE: A CsrcAL ANALYSIS OF CoNsTrImONAL LAw (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988). On the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, see: M. Kelman,
A Guide to CLS (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); LM. Finnis, On the CLS Movement
in I EcurA.AR, J. BELL (eds.), OXFORD EssAYs n JuitSPRUDENcE 3rd series (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987), at 145-165; Note, Round and Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to CLS, 95
HAR. L Rsv. 1669 (1982).
On debates over the connections/disconnections between law and literature, see S. LRvisoN ET AL.
(eds.), Inam'ssRziu LAW AND LrrRAwn A HmaxNsuc READER (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University
Press, 1988). See also G. Leyb, Toward a ConstitutionalHermeneutics, 32 AM J. PoL- Sc 369-387 (No.
2), (May, 1988).
Obviously, arguments which have their source in various philosophical versions of linguistic, epistemo-
logical, moral and cultural relativism must be dealt with by the reader of a constitutional text if she is to
avoid being ethnocentric. See J.W. Mmr irrAL (eds.), RAmL.timS: CooGmvwAi n MORAL (Notre Dame:
Notre Dame University Press, 1982); K. HoLus Hr AL. (eds.), RAnoNA An REmATVIsM (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1982); J. MUoous, ErAL. (eds.), RATIoNA=rY, R.Anr.Sm A Tim HuMAN Sc NcEs (Dordrecht-
MartinusNijhoff, 1986).
2 7 Even as late as 1943, the High Court of Australia overruled its own decisions to give effect to a decision
of the House of Lords (Piro v. W. Foster& Co. Ltd. 68 C.L.R. 313 (1943)). And, despite the series of de-
cisions which apparently culminated in national judicial independence (see Viro v. The Queen) 141
C.L.R. 88 (1978)), the High Court has still taken a more conservative view of precedent, and deferential
stance towards the legislature, than its American counterpart (see Dugan v. Mirror Newspapers Ltd. 142
C.L.R. 538 (1978); State Government Insurance Commission v. Trigweli 142 C.L.1. 617 (1979); Austra-
lian Conservation Foundation Inc. v. The Commonwealth of Australia 146 C.L.L 493 (1980); although
we shall see that this attitude has by no means been a bar to innovative policy-making. See the Hon. Mr.
Justice Michael McHugh, The Law-making Function of the Judicial Process - Parts I and If, 62 Ausn.
L. 15-31 (January 1988), 116-127, (February 1988), especially 20-24.
' W.K. Hancock (Australian historian) quoted in S. Encel, The Concept of the State in Australian Politics,
6AusuJ. oFPo AND HI sr. 62-76, at 65 (No. 1, May 1960). See also H.V.ErYAND O.E.HuOsS, AusmA-
utNPoumcs:REAm iN CoN'ucr (South Melbourne, Vic.: Macmillan, 1988); especially at 35-41.
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been granted responsible government by the U.K. in the 1850s, and had their own
constitutions (South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales, Western Australia,
Queensland and Tasmania), in "one indissoluble Commonwealth." Although the
impetus for Federation came from a variety of sources, including nationalist and
even democratic ones, those in the pro-Federation movement (and, indeed, the anti-
Federalists) were almost overwhelmingly concerned with practical economic and
fiscal matters (but, admittedly, xenophobia, and anxiety over the defence of Austra-
lia against intervention by the French in the New Hebrides, Russia in Asia, and
Germany in New Guinea in the 1880s, coupled with the mother country's wish that
her colonies share the burden of defence, certainly played their part): principally,
how to overcome the obstacles to the creation of a common market which self-
interested, artificial, colonial differences in tariff policies, railway rates, river regu-
lation, immigration, defence, posts and telegraphs, tariff policies and gold-field
regulation presented.
Among the Framers of the Australian Constitution, colonial politicians, judges,
lawyers, and pastoralists predominated, and there was an "almost complete absence
of the trade-unionists, wage-earners and small shopkeepers."" During the great
maritime strikes of 1890-91, the Labour Party was formed in New South Wales to
represent the interests of workers, but throughout the framing of the Constitution,
the Party's interests were unrepresented by it's own members (with the exception
of W.A. Trenwith from Victoria in 1897-1898). This task was left to democratic,
sometimes radical, liberals (like Victorian Judge Higgins) who promoted majority
rule, universal manhood suffrage, popular representation and worker interests, and
combatted - with varying success - conservatives who favored parliamentary
(not popular) formulation of the constitution, plural voting, franchise limited by
property holdings, the new Commonwealth (the term "Commonwealth" can be
used interchangeably with "Federal" to refer to the central national government)
Senate as a conservative upper house (like the House of Lords or the colonial upper
houses), and "free trade" or "protection" depending on their specific economic ties
(New South Welshmen strongly tended to support the former, Victorians the latter).
The movement proceeded through various phases from 1890 to 1900: begin-
ning its life with the initiative of colonial Premiers and Ministers (particularly
Henry Parkes, Premier of N.S.W., who sought a full national government which
would hopefully succeed in dealing with pressing inter-colonial problems where the
earlier "toothless" Federal Council [1885] had spectacularly failed) who set up the
first National Constitutional Convention to draft the Constitution in 1891 (creating
the draft Bill of 1891), to the popularly elected Convention of 1897-98 (producing
the draft Bills of 1897,1898), the Premiers' conference of 1899, and the various co-
lonial parliamentary debates and popular ratification referenda which preceded the
debate and ultimate enactment of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act
(1900) (U.K.) (it came into effect on 1 January 1901). Both the background of the
Framers and the only partially democratic nature of the framing process (W.A. and
Queensland, for instance, were poorly represented throughout the process), meant
that, as Crisp concludes, echoing Hancock,
Labour consequently played a negligible direct part in the shaping and
achievement of federation.
'L.F. CRIsP, AUSALuAN NAIONAL GoVERNME (Croydon, Vic., Australia: Longmans, Green 1965) 11;
Ch. 1 passim. See also J. QuicK AND R. GARAN THE ANNOTAihD CONSln'TON OF TfE AUSTALuAN COMMON.
WEALTH (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1901) Part IVpassim.
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It was for the most part the big men of the established political and eco-
nomic order, the men of property or their trusted allies who moulded the
federal Constitutional Bill. The pastoralists, merchants and lawyers -
turned politicians, tough-minded men of affairs... [who] saw federation
as an expedient provision of extended governmental machinery and in no
sense as a facilitation of major social change, much less of social revolu-
tion.
30
The Australia Act? were the culmination of a gradual process of increasing
recognition of Australia by the Imperial powers as a national polity with legislative,
executive and judicial autonomy and authority, and equal and independent dejure
sovereignty as a State at international law. This process had a number of key sig-
nals: the gaining of "responsible" self-government in the colonies, the enactment of
the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (1901) (U.K.), the Balfour Decla-
ration (1926) (which recognized the sovereign equality of Commonwealth "Domi-
nions"), and the Statute of Westminister (1931) (U.K.) (which ended the U.K.
Parliament's power to pass legislation affecting dominions without their request
and consent, § 4, and the operation in relation to the Commonwealth of the Colo-
nial Laws Validity Act (CLVA) (1856) (U.K.) which, broadly, invalidated Acts if
they were "repugnant' [inconsistent with] to the law of England - § 2 (2)).
Despite these developments, there were a number of important residual, Impe-
rial constitutional links with Australia remaining (which principally restricted or
interfered with the States' legislative power): links which the Commonwealth and
the States agreed on 16 August 1985 to abolish completely. The commitment to do
so followed the precedent of fellow Commonwealth member Canada's "patriation"
of its Constitution in 1982.
The end was to be achieved via a complicated "request" and "concurrence"
power in the Australian Constitution (§ 51 (xxxviii): "the exercise within the Com-
monwealth, at the request and with the concurrence of the Parliaments of all the
States directly concerned, of any power which can at the establishment of the Con-
stitution be exercised only by the Parliament of the U.K... ") whereby each of the
six States passed an Act (sharing the title Australia Acts (Request) Act (1985)) "re-
questing the Australian and British Parliaments to enact legislation terminating the
British Parliament's power to legislate for the Commonwealth,"32 followed by two
Commonwealth Acts - Australia (Request and Consent) Act (1985) § 3) and
Australia Act (1986) embodying the reform provisions agreed between the Com-
monwealth and the States, and declaring that they requested and consented to en-
actment by the UK Parliament of an Act containing those provisions. Such an Act
was indeed duly passed (Australia Act (1986) (U.K.)).
3 0 Crisp, supra note 29, at 14. For this account, I also drew upon Quick and Gan-an, supra note 29. and
W.G. MMm, A CNsrnoNAL ffH Ry oF AusrRAIA (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1979) Ch.
5. See also E.M. Hwr, A m ecA PRsmam iN AusrasRAL FnDERAnON (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1930) Chs. 1, 2 and lA. LANAuzF, THm MAKno OF THE AusrRAN CoNsmunoN (Melbourne: Mel-
bourne University Press, 1972) (still the most comprehensive of the Australian constitutional histories
available).
" The operative statute is the Australia Act (1986) (Cth.). The other Acts which enabled its enactment and
maintain its operation are: Australia Acts (Request) Act (1985) (passed by each of the States), Australia
(Request and Consent) Act (1985) (Cth.) and the Australia Act (1986) (U.K.).
" (Current Topics), Abolition of Residual Constitutional Links Between Australia and the United King-
dom, 60Ausn.IJ. 253,254 (May 1986).
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The operative Act, the Australia Act (1986) (Cth.) came into force 3 March
1986. The main effects of this Act were as follows: termination henceforth of the
power of the U.K. Parliament to legislate for Australia (Commonwealth, States or
Territory) (§ 1); State Parliaments were given full power to make laws having
extra-territorial application provided such laws were "for the peace, order and good
government" of that State (§ 2 (1)); State legislative powers were now to include
all legislative powers that the British Parliament might have exercised previously in
regard to the State concerned (§ 2 (2)); the CLVA was no longer to apply to State
Laws and no State law was to be held void or inoperative on the ground of "repug-
nancy" to any U.K. law (§ 3); the U.K. Parliament was to "cease to have responsi-
bility of any kind for the government of any Australian State" (§ 10); appeals to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (originally the highest court for the entire
British Empire) "from or in respect of any decision of an Australian court" (§ 11)
were terminated and prohibited (except for specific savings for previously insti-
tuted proceedings) so that "the High Court of Australia... [was] at long last the
final court of appeal in Australia."33
Despite the Australia Acts of 1986, the orthodox view that the Australian Con-
stitution owes its legal force to the paramountcy of the British legislation in which
it was enacted has held sway in the High Court.3' It is submitted that the orthodox
understanding of the formal source of legal validity of the Constitution rests on
much firmer ground than any theory about democratic compacts or popular sover-
eignty in Australia - "We the People of Australia" did not enact the Common-
wealth of Australia Constitution Act (1900) (U.K.) § 9, the locus of our
Constitution?5
The strength of legal positivism in Australia, and the correspondingly weak
natural or higher law tradition in its constitutionalism, 6 contributed to the doctrine
whereby the Constitution as an Act of Parliament was to be interpreted according
to the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation used in English courts.
"Id. at 254-55. 1. Goldring, The Australia Act 1986 and the Formal Independence of Australa, Public
Law 196 (1986); R.D. Lumb, The Bicentary of Australian Constitutionalism: The Evolution of Rules of
Constitutional Change, 15 (1)U. QLD.LJ. 3 (1988).
' The orthodox view is that the Australian Constitution "is not a supreme law purporting to obtain its
force from the direct expression of people's inherent authority to constitute a government. It is a statute of
the British Parliament enacted in the exercise of its legal 'sovereignty over the law everywhere in the
King's Dominions," 0. Dixon, The Law and the Constitution, 51 L. Q. Rav. 590,597 (1935). See also 3.
Latham, Interpretation of the Constitution, in EssAYs ON T AusmL CONSTrumnoN, R. ELsE-MrrcuLL
(ed.) 2nd. ed., 1, 5, 8 (1961); Deakin v. Webb 1 C.L. 585, 630 (1904); Victoria v. Commonwealth
(1971) 122 C.LR. 353 in R.D. LMrA, THa CoNsnrriroN OF m CommuNWEALTH OF AUSTmAuA ANNOTAiSO
(Melbourne: Butterworths, 1986) paras. 025, 200, 222, 228, 690, 717; A.G. (Cth.) ex rel McKinlay v.
Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.LR. 1, 17; G. Winterton, Extra-Constitutional Notions in Australian Con-
stitutional Law, 16 Far. L Rv. 235-38 (1986); J.A. Thomson, The Australian Constitution: Statute, Fun-
damentalDocument or Compact?, L.w INsr. . 1199 (November 1985).
" Mark Moshinsky has recently argued effectively that it is by no means clear that the Australia Acts have
altered the (legal) source of the authority of our Constitution,. Indeed, the U.K. version of the Australia
Act, arguably necessary for the validity of the scheme, relies on the paramountcy of U.K_ legislation for its
effectiveness: Re-enacting the Constitution in an Australian Ac 18 Fa. L. Ray. 134-137 (1989). For al-
ternative views on the relevance of versions of popular sovereignty to Australian Constitutional authority,
see the views of Murphy J., summarized in Winterton (1986) supra note 34, passim; Thomson (1985) su-
pra note 34, passim; GJ. Lindell Why is Australias Constitution Binding? - The Reasons in 1900 and
Now and the Effect of Independence, 16 FED. L. Ray. 29 (1986); S. Gageler, Foundations of Australian
Federalism and theRole ofJudiciallevew 17 F.L. Ra v. 162-174 (1987); Hon. SirA. Mason, TheAus-
tralian Constitution 1901-1988, 62 AUSM.LJ. 752-755 (October 1988); Lumb (1988), supra note 33.
" On the relative weakness of Australia's fundamental law tradition (if it can even be said to have one),
compared with the U.S.A., see Winterton (1986) supra note 34,228-235.
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This approach requires the court to ascertain the intention of Parliament as re-
vealed in the words of the text of an Act. "Intention" was understood in the artifi-
cial sense of the "will" of the legislature "manifest" in the words of the text, not as
a retrospective, and sometimes no doubt posthumous, exercise in psychological
analysis of present or past Parliamentarians.
As we have noted, the High Court purports to follow the English model and
not without some practical effect. Officially, for instance, the Court does not take
notice of the Convention debates, records of which had been thought to be too in-
complete (excluding drafting committees and so forth) or to invite dangerous dis-
traction from the words of the text adopted in the various popular State referenda3
The text would be construed by the Court in the light of various canons of con-
struction including prominentlythe Mischief Rule and many other maxims in Latin
too tedious to recite.3s The Mischief Rule, for instance, is a subset of the more
general purposive approach to statutory interpretation in England: to discover why
Parliament is changing or adding to the background of legislation, constitutional
law and common law already in existence
look to the overall intention of the legislature as discovered from reading
the statute as a whole... [asking] what 'mischief' [or social, legal 'de-
fect,' 'evil,' or 'lack'] this statute was intended to remedy... [One must
ask] [w]hat social purpose was intended to be achieved by this legislation.
.. [and then] read each word and phrase so as to carry out that purpose to
the extent that they are capable of being so read.39
A- G (Cth.) exrelMcKinlay v. The Commonwealth 135 C.L.R. 1 (1975), at 17,47; Municipal Council
of Sydney v. The Commonwealth 1 C.L.R. 208 (1904), at 213-214. Tasmania v. Commonwealth (1904) 1
C.L1R. 329, 333 arguendo; Attorney-General (Vic.) and Black v. Commonwealth 146 C.L.L 559 (1981),
578 (per Barwick CJ.; "attention to the course of the Convention Debates might well distract the mind
from the proper meaning of unambiguous words in the text"). See also the cases cited in Thomson (1982)
supra note 4, at 314; and see Coper (1987) supra note 5, at 412; Mason (1986) supra note 1, at 25; Daw-
son (1990) supra note 2, at 93-94; Burmester in Craven (1986), supra note 5, at 29. But cf. Seamen's
Union of Australia v. Utah Development Co. 144 C.L.L 120 (1978), at 143-144; Murphy . in Attorey-
General (Vic.) and Black v. Commonwealth, this note, at 626 and in Re Pearson; ex parte Sipka 57
A.LJ.R. 225, 232 (1983). The inadmissibility rule has not, however, stopped the High Court from refer-
ring to the Convention Debates in an elliptical fashion or using other historical sources: Coper, supra note
5, at 413-414: "In any event, the High Court's practice of treating the Convention Debates as inadmissible
seems now to have changed, although without express acknowledgement"); Burmester, supra note 5, at
29); Mason (1986), supra note 1, at 26. See also the Incorporation Case, infra.
" The usual formal approach by the High Court to constitutional interpretation has been well-summarized
by the Hon. Sir Daryl Dawson:
"The exercise in the case of a statute is spoken of as an attempt to ascertain the intention of
the legislature. Although it is spoken of in that way, we all know that it is not an attempt to as-
certain the actual intention of the legislature because no such intention really exists... What is
meant is that a court will construe the language of a statute and arrive at the intention which is
revealed by that language. If none is revealed, it is still not possible traditionally to look at the
intentions of individuals, although it is permissible to look at history to see what the problem
was that it was attempting to cure, and to construe the statute accordingly"
Dawson (1990), supra note 2, at 93. See notes 9, 10, 11 in Thomson (1982), supra note 5, at 314. For a
detailed examination of English and Australian maxims of statutory construction, see D.C. PARacE &R.S.
GEDDES, STATUTORY INIERPErrIATN (Melbourne: Butterworths, 1988).
39 D.P. DERHAM ANINTRODUCONTO LAw (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1977) 139, 138. The locus classi-
cus of this approach in English law is to be found in Heydon's Case 3 Co.Rep. 7a. (1584). For a detailed
exploration of the Mischief Rule as a legislative presumption, and of purposive construction generally, see
F.A.R. BmmoN, STATUTRY hnrwERPRTATION: CODIFIED wrTH A cRITcAL comMNTARY (London: Butterworths,
1984) 631-656, Part XV.
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According to current High Court doctrine - and it must be stressed that it is
the judges who control the admissibility of materials and facts in constitutional in-
terpretation4O - the meaning to be given to a word in the Constitution is that which
it had at the date of the enactment in 190.1
However, the strict theory has been mitigated by judicial practice in a number
of ways: by the recognition that it is a Constitution being interpreted; by the influ-
ence of the common law tradition of evolutionary, judge-made law; by the Court's
reference to legislative history and general historical development; by purposive
and structural interpretation using implied principles and extra-constitutional no-
tions; and by policy choices.
The Court has recognized that the Constitution is not an ordinary statute; it is
"a mechanism under which laws are to be made and not a mere Act which declares
what the law is to be," as Mr. Justice Higgins once said.42 His statement reflects
what Sir Anthony Mason has recently called the High Court's "dynamic rule of
constitutional interpretation.' 43 According to this rule one should construe the
-Constitution broadly and flexibly to meet the needs of the current generation of
Australians. As Sir Owen Dixon once explained, the Constitution is "an instrument
of government meant to endure and conferring powers expressed in general propo-
sitions wide enough to be capable of flexible application to changing circumstan-
ces."
This principle now finds more modem expression in Barwick's connotation/de-
notation distinction which means, crudely, that the essence of a word can remain
the same as in 1900 but it can apply to a related concept, exemplification or new
instance not foreseen in 1900.' S The connotation is fixed, the denotation changing.
Of course, this distinction can, at times, be highly artificial.
With regard to interpretation of the Constitution, reference may be made by
the High Court to the draft bills of 1891, 1897 and 1898. We may now identify
the main content of these constitution drafts. The 1891 Bill was the result of an
unelected National Australasian (so-called because of New Zealand's early in-
volvement) Convention of State Premiers and delegates (forty-five men in all) in
Sydney - and was drafted principally by Sir Samuel Griffith (Premier of Queens-
land, a lawyer, "declared positivist," and ah "arch-conservative politically'). 7 It
embodied the main features that now exist ia the Commonwealth Constitution.
These features may be listed as follows: a bi-cameral Federal Parliament with equal
representation for all States in the Senate with the House of Representatives pre-
dominating in matters of finance and the control of the Executive; the possibility of
responsible government along British Westminister cabinet lines; a federal tax uni-
form in all states with concurrent "state" tax powers; state determination of elector-
' See Burmester in Craven (1986), supra note 5, at 26.
41 Rv. Barger I C.L.R. 41 (1908), at 68; King v. Jones 128 C.LR. 221 (1972), at 229; Bonserv. LaMaccia
122 C.L..L 177 (1969), in Lumb (1986), supra note 33, paras. 269,270,351,696. See also Mason (1986),
supra note 1, at 26.
' Attrney-General forNSWv. Brewery Employees Union ofNSW 6 C.LR. 469 (1908), at 612.
4 Mason (1986), supra note 1, at 23.
44 Quoted in id. at 26.
45
1 Id. at 26.
" Tasmania v. Commonwealth I C.L.RL 329 (1904), at 333 per Griffith C.J. arguendo; A.G. (Cth.) v. T.
& G. Mutual Life Society Ltd. 52 A.LJ.R. 573, 583 (1978) (Aickin J.). See also Thomson (1982) supra
note 6, n.13, at 315.
A. DAViDSON, TrmINvism SrATETHFORMAION OF THiAuSRAuiAN STATi 1788-1901 (Melbourne: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991) 231.
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al boundaries; a Federal Supreme Court; free trade between the states.
Commentators Quick and Garran describe the impact of the Bill in the following
way:
The idea was once and for all crystallized into a practical scheme:
The real work of the Convention was now practically finished, [for] in the
first draft of 1891 the whole foundation and framework of the present con-
stitution was contained... [although] it was in some few respects less es-
sentially democratic in its basis... [and] less definite and less elaborate in
its treatment of the vexed problems... In those few days they [the Fram-
ers] laid down the main lines from which the movement has never since
wavered. On 2nd March 1891, Australian Federation was a misty abstrac-
tion; on 31st March it had definite outlines and a practical policy.
Thus, the subsequent drafts of 1897 and 1898 embellished but did not substan-
tially alter this model.
Attempts by the Framers to forge inter-colonial agreement on the 1891 Bill by
parliamentary means failed. As Quick and Garran note:
neither the [colonial] Parliaments nor the people would accept the work of
the [1891] Convention as final... [for] in the minds of many of the peo-
ple there was a vague feeling of distrust of the Constitution as the work of
a body somewhat conservative in composition, only indirectly representa-
tive of the people, and entrusted with no very definite or detailed mandate
by the Parliaments which created it0 9
The Bills of 1897 and 1898 were the result of "popularly" elected national
Conventions (according to Davidson, "The 'popular [pro-Federation] movement's'
leadership was in fact composed almost exclusively of middle-class, commercial
and dependent professional interests... and, when finally there were elections of
delegates to a further convention, the 'popular mandate' which returned the old
guard of 1891 to Adelaide in 1897 totalled slightly more than 55 percent of all vot-
ers"5 - and Queensland was not represented at all) in Adelaide, Sydney and Mel-
bourne.
The 1897 Adelaide Convention, while claiming with their "democratic" man-
date to "begin at the beginning," commenced by discussing leading principles "al-
most exactly in the form of Parkes' resolutions of 1891 [on which the 1891 Bill
was based]."51 Indeed, the draftsmen of the 1897 Bill had "endeavoured to treat as
reverently as possible"52 the 1891 Bill. The main changes in the 1897 version can
be summarized as follows: a ratio was established between the numbers of repre-
sentatives in each House of Parliament (with twice as many in the House of Repre-
sentatives as in the Senate); a Federal franchise was prescribed (States would
determine by what criteria a person [usually a male] would be entitled to vote in
future Federal elections); money bills were to originate in the Lower House; "res-
ponsible government" was formally provided for in the condition (following a sec-
tion in the South Australian Constitution Act of the time) that no Commonwealth
Minister of the Crown hold office for more than three months without obtaining a
48 Quick and Garan, supra note 29, at 136-37.
4
1 Id. at 144.
"O Davidson, supra note 47, at 233.
"Quick and Garran, supra note 29, at 166.
SId.
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seat in Parliament; the High Court of Australia was to be established by the Con-
stitution (not left merely within the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parlia-
ment as in 1891), and given a final appellate jurisdiction; substantial alterations to
the financial clauses; any Commonwealth or State law derogating from the freedom
of trade protection would be null and void; and the provision of a more democratic
constitutional amendment process whereby a proposed change would have to pass
through Parliament and then be submitted to the electors of the States (a successful
amendment would require approval by the electors in a majority of States and ap-
proval by an overall majority of Australian electors - in the 1891 Bill a proposed
change was to be submitted to Parliament - elected "State Conventions"). The
1897 Bill went through the convention's committee process (constitutional, finan-
cial, judicial and drafting committees), before being submitted to the various colo-
nial legislatures for approval.
At the Sydney session of the 1897 Convention, the framers had before them
286 proposed amendments to the Adelaide draft, suggested by the ten colonial
Houses of Parliament. The session closed "before more than half of the Constitu-
tion had been considered"'3 and it had earlier reduced consideration of the amend-
ments to "four great questions: the financial problem [how to resolve conflicts of
interest between 'big' and 'small' - in terms of population - states], the basis of
representation in the Senate, the power of the Senate with regard to Money Bills
and the insertion of a provision for deadlocks [a joint sitting of the Commonwealth
Houses of Parliament should there be a deadlock between them over 'legislation-
']."' Apart from the deadlock procedure, the only other significant innovation at
this session was that the Senate was to be given the power to originate Bills involv-
ing only incidentally the appropriation of fines or fees (following a then existing
Standing Order of the House of Commons, U.K.).
According to Quick and Garran, the Melbourne Session of the convention in
1898 (20 January - 17 March) was "the longest and most important of all.""5 The
whole 1897 Bill was considered and reviewed clause-by-clause in the Drafting
Committee; significant debate occurring on the issues of the regulation of rivers
and railway rates and finance. However, the only important changes were as fol-
lows: legislative authority of the Commonwealth Parliament was now to extend to
"invalid and old-age pensions" and to the acquisition of property for the public pur-
poses of the Commonwealth; the High Court of Australia was to be the highest
court of appeal (unless the public interests of some other part of the Queen's do-
minions [for example, Canada] were concerned); and the Court was also to be "the
final arbiter and interpreter of the Constitution.' 56
There has been no clear explanation of why logically the Court should limit
itself to these particular draft bills (why, for instance, is reference not made to the
Bill produced at the 1899 Premiers' Conference which made seven amendments to
the 1898 Bill, and which was then put to the second national referendum?). Nei-
ther has it been explained why it is legitimate for the Court to gather evidence from
general textbook histories of Federation, including Quick and Garran's commen-
tary,57 but not to examine the primary sources in Convention debates and elsewhere
which are relied upon by their authors. The Court has sought to seal off history as
'3 Id. at 193.
4 Id.. at 188.
"Id. at 194.TMId. at 202.
57 Quick and Garran, supra note 31.
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original intent, which is illegitimate, from general history, though in practice it has
resorted to both.5s
We can now further demonstrate the deficiency of approaching constitutional
interpretation in Australia from an originalist perspective by employing the same
framework that was used in examining the role of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Can we readily ascertain the original intent of the Australian Founding Fa-
thers? Clearly, the problem concerning the fact that the Framers will not have al-
ways turned their attention to, or debated, issues currently before the constitutional
court holds equally well in the Australian as in the American situation. Nor can the
Australian "originalist" (actually a rather rare breed) avoid difficulties with the
completeness, accuracy and bias of the records of the national Constitutional con-
ventions from 1891 to 1898. These difficulties are made more acute by the long-
held, formal, "settled doctrine in Australia", as Barwick, CJ. said, "that the record
of the discussion [debates] in the Conventions and in the legislatures of the colonies
will not be used [by the High Court of Australia] as an aid to the construction of the
Constitution." The Constitution was to be approached "simply" by "read[ing] the
language of the Constitution itself."'59 Thus, if this formal rule is an accurate depic-
tion of High Court practice, then the Convention record - that is, the most obvious
evidentiary source of the Framers' intentions - would be excluded from judicial
consideration. In fact, however, as Coper, Mason and Burmester have noted, this
inadmissibility rule has not stopped (although it inevitably limits or affects judicial
practice) the High Court from referring to the Convention Debates in an elliptical
fashion or using other historical sources. As Burmester has stated,
The rejection by the High Court of the use of the convention Debates in
the early years has continued to be the general position taken by that Court
ever since, although exceptions have inevitably occurred. All the judg-
ments are artificial, to the extent that they close their eyes to what the
framers actually said, and yet resort to other historical material.'
To complicate matters, in the recent Incorporation Case, the High Court ap-
pears to have watered down its own rule since it made decisive use of "a quite lib-
eral dose of information gleaned from the Convention Debates" to hold that the
Commonwealth lacks the power under § 51 (xx) of the Constitution to legislate in
relation to the incorporation of trading and financial corporations.'
As previously mentioned, the High Court has not coherently explained why
John Quick and Robert Garran's Annotated Constitution of the Australian Com-
monwealth (1901), which draws heavily on the Convention Debates, can be con-
sulted but not the Debates themselves. Indeed, if a "neutral" interpretation was
sought by legalists in the High Court, why rely on a textbook authored by lawyers
ss "The Court does... permit, and more frequently indulge in, more general historical exposition includ-
ing the formation of the Constitution, evolution of particular provisions and pre-Federation history."
(Footnotes omitted), Thomson (1982), supra note 5, at 310. Burmester in CRAvEN (1986), supra note 5, at
30.
" A.G. (Cth.) ex rel. McKinlay v. The Commonwealth 135 C.L.L 1 (1975), at 17, 19, 24, quoted in Da-
vidson, supra note 47, at 310, n.30.
60 Burmester, supra note 5, at 29. See also Coper supra note 5; Mason supra note 2, at n.40.
61 The majority of the High Court in N.S.W. v. The Commonwealth [the Incorporation Case] 169 C.LR.
482 (1990), at 501 (following Cole v. Whitfield 165 C.L.R. 360 (1988), at 385; Port MacDonell Profes-
sional Fishermen's Association Inc. v. South Australia 168 C.L..L 340 (1989), at 375-377) (Deane, L dis-
senting). The quotation is from R. Baxt, Whither companies and securities law Australia?, 18 Ausm Bus.
L. Rav. 195 (June 1990).
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who had been active in the pro-Federation movement? Garran was a councillor of
the Australian Federation League of New South Wales, author and distributor of
pro-Federalist books and other propaganda, Secretary to the Drafting Committee of
1897-1898, and Secretary to Premier Reid at the 1899 Premiers' Conference.
Quick was himself a Founding Father, rising to this status from being a journalist
on the Federalist Age newspaper in Melbourne, a member of the Victorian Legis-
lative Assembly (lower house) under Premier Deakin, an active member of the
Australian Natives' Association, and founder of the Bendigo Federal League
(president 1893, 1898, 1899). In 1893, his proposal that a national constitutional
convention be popularly elected was adopted, and he himself was elected as a Vic-
torian delegate to the Australian Federal Convention which framed the Common-
wealth Constitution in 1897-1898 (being active in the Constitutional Committee).
The authors' personal involvement is reflected in their history which is laced with
centralist, pro-Federalist, Imperialist, and anti-labour glosses on the Constitution,
draft Bills debates, and popular reactions. In finding the Convention Debates inad-
missible as evidence in High Court constitutional interpretation, Barwick, C.J. had,
citing with approval Dixon's "strict and complete legalism," declared that
[t]he problem which is presented to the Court is the matter of the legal
construction of the Constitution of Australia; itself a legal document; an
Act of the Imperial Parliament. The problem is not to be solved by resort
to slogans or to political catchcries or to vague and imprecise expressions
of political philosophy....'
This declaration is inconsistent with the Court's use of Quick and Garran's
commentary in constitutional interpretation, a text which is replete with just the
sort of slogans, political catchcries and crude political philosophies that Barwick,
C.J claims to ignore (and this commentary is one of the most-respected "extra-
legal" sources on the Commonwealth Constitution). Further, as postmodern and
other critics would be quick to emphasize, just as interesting and powerful, are the
silences in Quick and Garran's text - assumptions made, ideologies and philoso-
phies neglected or omitted, and "catchcries" unheard, invented, ignored or stifled
(for instance, the radical, socialist critique of the Draft Bills to be found in the
nineteenth-century publication Tocsin)." Similarly, the existence of debate or the
lack of it on an issue is ambiguous as to that issue's importance (for instance,
would lack of discussion on a written, entrenched Bill of Rights mean that rights
were to the Framers less important goals, or that they were thought to be already
adequately protected by the ordinary common law, or some such institution?).
The difficult task of identifying exactly who is to be counted a "Framer,"
which we saw in examining the American originalism is equally - if not more so
- a problem with regard to the creation of the Australian Constitution between
1890 and 1901. Were the "Framers" the fourteen delegates to the Melbourne Con-
ference (1890)? The forty-five delegates at Sydney in 1891? The fifty delegates at
the 1897-1898 Conventions? These are only some of the perplexing questions one
can ask in relation to the Constitutional Conventions. Other problems involve
questions of hierarchy and authority concerning which persons count and to what
extent should the views of long-standing active "framers" be preferred (even when
not spending much time on a particular issue)? What of the committeemen and the
'"Seethe entries on Gan-an and Quick in Vols. 8 and 11 respectively in AusRAuANDcnoNARYoFBIooLA.
PHY (1891-1939) (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1981).
'3 See Davidson, supra note 47, at 231, n.60.
See Davidson, supra note 47, at 235-36.
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relation between committees? What of the colonial Parliamentary and popular in-
terventions and interpretations (like Quick's, for example)? What of participants at
Premiers' Conferences? What of members of the U.K. Parliament and Home Of-
fice? No adequate originalist theory has emerged to recommend how one would
answer these questions and simultaneously reconcile the inevitable conflicts of
opinion that would and did emerge.
In any case, what evidence of the Framers' "intentions" (remembering that this
is a fiction in the sense offictio - made, constructed - since we cannot "get in-
side" anyone's mind so as to know a person's intention as she herself does) that can
be gathered seems to point against any notion that the Australian "Founding Fa-
thers" intended their own intentions to be controlling in constitutional interpreta-
tion: if they were, to generalize, under the spell of an interpretive theory it was
legalism not originalism (a spell because, as we have seen, the formal theory was
often departed from or had unintended consequences). At least formally, the Aus-
tralian judiciary, including the High Court, is still wedded to the "ordinary" English
canons of statutory construction, despite judicial and extra-judicial statements re-
flecting a weakening of the bond. ' Additionally, progressive liberals at the Con-
ventions "intended" that the constitution be populist and dynamic - why else the
power of the people under § 128 to amend the Constitution? It has also been right-
ly argued by Professor Tribe in relation to the U.S. Constitution, but certainly ap-
plicable to the Australian constitutional language (if not as strongly), that
[t]he very generality of many of the terms the Framers used - such as lib-
erty, due process and equal protection - strongly suggests an intent not to
confine their meaning to the specific outcomes and contexts of those who
first used them, but to invite the development of meanings in the light of
the needs and insights of succeeding generations."
The normative arguments in favor of originalism in the U.S. such as legislative
democratic majoritarianism, authorial interpretation of texts, and the supposed lack
of principled alternatives fares equally poorly in Australia, but for some different
reasons. Here I can only give a sketch of these reasons: the dubious "democratic"
credentials of the framing process (Australian Aborigines did not take part, nor did
most women); the originalist normative view underestimates the extent to which
the High Court has (although erratically), and can, promote a Dworkinian, human-
istic, cosmopolitan notion of democracy that it is concerned with treating all per-
sons with fair and equal concern and respect67 (especially important when a
parliamentary majority uses its power to unfairly discriminate against a minority's
interests); that the interpretation of texts via authorial intention is hardly the only
approach to obtaining meaning and needs arguments as to how one can do it and
why it is preferable to other "readings" (for example, textual, hermeneutic decon-
structionist and "postmodernist" ones)6; and that in any case, the High Court, for
's See Mason, supra note 1; Brennan, ., Courts, Democracy and the Law, 65 Ausr. L.J 32 (January
1991).
"Lawrence Tibe, Dialogue, No. 75 (1987), 29-32, quoted in (Current Topics), The Constitutional Doc-
trine of original intent, 61(2) Ausm.LJ. 51-53, at 52.
The increasing "domestification" of international law norms in Australian municipal law via Common-
wealth treaty-making, legislation, and High Court interpretation, gives some legal reality to this moral as-
piration. See Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen 153 C.LR. 168 (1982); Commonwealth v. Tasmania
(Tasmanian Dam case) 46 A.L.R. 625 (1983); Richardson v. The Forestry Commission (Tas) and Anor.
62 A.L.R. 158 (noted 62 Ausr. LJ. 319-321 (1988)); P. BmLEY, Hut.NRiamS AusIA IN AN INTmhA-
TIONAL CoNrxtr (Melbourne: Butterworths, 1990); B. Hocamo (En.), IrEmAIONA. L.w AND ABORIOiNAL
HuN RimS (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1988).
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its part, seems to prefer, as a formal approach, to derive the intention of Parliament
(not the Framers) via textual and purposive interpretation. Of course this list by no
means exhausts the possibilities for a critique of originalist normative arguments,
but in itself constitutes at least one demonstration of the deficiency of those argu-
ments.
Studies by Coper, Zines and Winterton" amass substantial evidence that the
High Court's purposive Constitutional interpretation has not been confined to the
text but has embraced various extra-Constitutional notions such as federalism, the
national interest, responsible government, separation of powers and democracy.
The principle of federalism has been held by the Court to imply both the necessity
of judicial review to a judge between Commonwealth and State powers, and the
assumption in the Constitution that there are limits to Commonwealth power." The
use of the concept of "nationhood" by the High Court has expanded the Common-
wealth's legislative and executive power, especially via the external affairs power
as enlarged in the Tasmanian Dam case.7
In the Tasmanian Dam case the High Court held that Commonwealth legis-
lation halting the construction of a dam in a Tasmanian wilderness region by the
conservative State government was valid - principally, as an exercise of the Com-
monwealth's legislative power under § 51 (xxix) of the constitution (the " ... pow-
er to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth
with respect to: ... External affairs"). The court's judgement was explained on the
basis that the legislation was passed pursuant to Australia's obligations, under an
international treaty which the Commonwealth had executed (The UNESCO Con-
vention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage), to protect
the natural environment in the region which would be threatened by a dam. The
Commonwealth legislation was also valid by connection with § 51 (xxvi) of the
Constitution (laws with respect to "the people of any race for whom it is deemed
necessary to make special laws") since it was directed towards protecting Austra-
lian Aboriginal artifacts in the area. The case was highly publicized and politicized
because both leaders and parties of the respective governments had recently been
elected on mandates to "build the dam" (Tasmanian Liberal [conservative] Party
Government) or "save the wilderness" (Commonwealth [Australian Labor Party]
Government).
The High Court's 4-3 decision, significantly enlarged central government pow-
er, "international" considerations providing authority, in the Court's view, for the
aSee Levy, supra note 4.
69Coper, supra note 5, and The High Court and the World ofPolicy 14 FED. L. RE. 294 (1984); L ZINss,
Mm HIH COURT AND THE CONSmUTIoN (Melbourne: Butterworths, 1987) and The State of Constitutional
Interpretation, 14 FEDEALI. Rav. 277; Winterton (1986), supra note 34.
70 See Gageler (1987), supra note 35; Coper (1984) supra note 5; Zines (1984) supra note 69.
71 Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) (46 A.L.. 625 (considering inter alta the reach of the external af-
fairs power of the Commonwealth under x.51 (XXIX) of the Constitution). See also Rv. Burgess, ex parte
Henry 55 C.L.R. 608 (1936) - in Lumb (1986), supra note 33, paras. 209, 216, 342, 245, 247, 249, 471;
New South Wales v. The Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands) 135 C.L.R. 337 (1975), in Lumb,
supra note 33, paras. 270, 271, 346, 471, 476, 484, 646, 697, 744; Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersn 153
C.L.R. 168 (1982), in Lumb, supra note 33, paras. 034, 330, 346. The result of the Koowarta and Tasma-
nian Dam cases is that the "external" affairs power has intruded into domestic or "internal" affairs and
"there are virtually no limits to the topics within this wide power if the Commonwealth wants to use it"
P.H. LAwa, AN INTRODUCnON TO Tm AUSrIAAN ConmuoN (Sydney: Law Book Company, 5th ed.,
1990), at 100. See also Kirmani v. Captain Cook Cruises Pty. Ltd. (No. 1) 159 C.LR. 351 (1985). On the
"implied nationhood" power, see Davis etal. v. Commonwealth of Australia et al.166 C.L.R. 79 (1988).
(interpreting § 51 (XXXIX), 52, 61 of the Constitution) and Tasmanian Dam case, /nila:
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Commonwealth to supplant State legislative and executive rights. This decision
prompted some critics (especially conservative States' rights Premiers and land de-
velopers) to say that Australian Federalism had been pronounced dead; worse still,
by persons who in these critics' view, had no authority to do so - judges un-
elected by the people and failing to consult them. On the other hand, the decision
was a great victory for "centralists," the Australian Labor Party (in government at
the Federal Level at the time), Aboriginal rights groups, and the "green" environ-
mentalist movement.7
The choices High Court judges have to make between national needs or the
federal balance are, as in the Tasmanian Dam case, inevitably value and policy
choices. Unfortunately, the Court has rarely been open about the choices it is mak-
ing, the justification for them and how they "trump" competing considerations.
This obviously reduces the accountability and democratic nature of the judiciary.
Research by Murphy, Fleming and Harris.' demonstrates that the kind of non-
textual notions relied upon by the High Court of Australia in its purposive constitu-
tional interpretation, have, if anything, been even more readily employed (for rea-
sons already identified) in American constitutional interpretation.
Structural/teleological analysis, which relates a particular clause being interpreted
to the overall structure and "ends" of the whole "Constitution" as a text and
politico-moral scheme, and which constitutes a particular kind of polity, has been
employed by the U.S. Supreme Court to bolster, variously, the doctrine of "clear
mistake" (to strike down legislation if "the violation of the Constitution is so plain
that no person could entertain rational doubts about the violation"7 '), the commit-
ment to representative democracy (see, e.g., Justice Harlan Stone's footnote 4 in
the Carolene Products Case75), economic libertarianism (see, e.g., Meyer v. Ne-
braska7 ), or fundamental rights (see, e.g., Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecti-
cut'; Griswold v. Connecticut'). Structural analysis has also been essential to the
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution as a federal constitution - requiring inter-
pretation concerning the distribution of power between the States and the Nation;
and seen, for example, in judicial controversies over the meaning and extent of pro-
visions such as the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and anti-
discrimination imperatives. The Supreme Court has, for example, developed the
notion of "suspect classifications" - evolving out of the segregation cases and ju-
dicial reaction to the Korematsu case79 - of race, gender, religion and ethnicity.
This doctrine requires that persons not be treated arbitrarily or unfairly on the basis
of these classifications (of course, most laws will discriminate to some degree in
defining the class of persons to which they are addressed; as, for instance, is the
case with affirmative action laws). Judicial policy-making combining norma-
tive/purposive interpretation and prudential considerations can be detected in the
Court's "balancing of interests" in the segregation cases, the communism cases
(especially Watkins v. United States and Yates v. United States) and Roe v.
' See Galligan, supra note 3, at 240-248; Detmold, supra note 5, at 1, 2, 26, 163, 164, 165, 172, 173, 174;
(Current Topics), The Twilight ofState sovereignty? 57 (9) Ausm LJ. 487-488 (1983).
73 AMRcIAN CONSMITmIONALINTWRETATION (Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, 1986).
74 Id. at 297.
7' 304 U.S. 144 (1938); id. at 298.
' 262 U.S. 390 (1923) cited in Id. at 300.
7 302 U.S. 319 (1937) cited in id.
71381 U.S. 479 (1965) cited in id. at 113.
79 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), discussed in id. at 62-73.
10 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). Yates v. United States 354 U.S. 298 (1957) cited in id..,
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I have argued that neither strict originalism nor legalism can be decisive in
questions of constitutional interpretation. In the U.S.A. the intent of the Framers,
or in Australia the often absurd assertion of the "plain meaning of the text," has
veiled the complex web of principles, policies and preferences necessarily involved
in constitutional interpretation and adjudication. However, it is a web continually
being spun and re-spun even as judges deny such activism.
In Australia, for example, how does one find the "plain meaning" of the words
"absolutely free" in § 92 which states, inter alia, that "On the imposition of uni-
form duties of customs [by the newly-created Commonwealth Government in
1901], trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by means of
internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free"? 8" The High Court
has in various cases since 1920 relied on textualism and literalism in interpreting
these words and has inevitably been faced with absurd or contradictory meanings:
namely, either that the expression "absolutely free" means that all intercourse be-
tween States (commercial or otherwise) is entirely free from any legal regulation
by the Commonwealth which would completely undermine the purpose of Federa-
tion (to create a nation with a central government and a federal system with at least
some overarching, uniform, national laws); or, that the expression means that the
interstate trade, commerce and intercourse is only "relatively" free which would, it
appears, flatly contradict the "plain" meaning of the words "absolutely free".
This was the position of Justice Mason when in Permewan Wright's case he said
that: "the freedom which § 92 guarantees is a qualified, not an absolute, free-
dom."' The Court has tried to skirt these problems by implausibly distinguishing
between "absolutely free" and "license" (as Detmold asks, "And what is license if
not absolute liberty?")' so that Commonwealth legal regulation of interstate com-
merce and intercourse would be allowable, and by the balancing (without prin-
cipled elaboration, justification or delimitation) of "community interests" against
the (presumed) interests of traders in free trade guaranteed under § 92. This ap-
proach has produced an ad hoc, inconsistent and vague High Court jurisprudence
and precedent on § 92. If the Court had paid attention to the fundamental political
and constitutional principle and point of § 92 (but not in a narrow originalist
terms), it is argued that a more coherent and flexible interpretation could have
emerged.
What § 92 sought to achieve was a comprehensive, federal commonwealth and
community; covering not just trade and commerce but all intercourse between
States ("every conceivable way by which human beings deal with one another").
Seen in this light, then, Commonwealth laws regulating interstate intercourse are
essential to preserving Federal freedom - resisting, for instance, monopolistic,
fraudulent, unfair, misleading or parochial State interested economic and other
practices not conducive to the commonwealth. Naturally, when Commonwealth
laws can themselves be characterized by these descriptions, § 92 can be interpreted
370, n.1.
" 410 U.S. 413 (1973).
t'2 For a survey of interpretations of section 92, see P.H. LAN4 A MANUAL oF AusmAuAN CONammoNAL
LAw (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1987); 375-409. See also the references listed in Thomson (1982),
supra note 5, at 325.
Detmold, supra note 5, at 35-36.
t4 Permewan Wright v. Trewhitt 145 C.L.R. 34 (1979), quoted in id. at 36.
t Id. at 35.
" Id. at 43.
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to invalidate them. It is these anti-federal, anti-commonwealth laws from which
interstate "intercourse" is "absolutely free." As Detmold elaborates:
The fundamental constitutional provision by which the Australian colo-
nists sought to transform their designs into reality was § 92 .... For an
organic commonwealth the section was critical. Its function was the open-
ing of the colonial markets and communities to each other, and thereby the
organic construction and continuing nourishment of the Australian com-
munity, the point and life of the Australian commonwealth... The con-
stitutional charge is to invalidate only those laws incompatible with the
(expanded) commonwealth.'7
Unless one is no longer to accord a written constitution authority as law for the
present generation, one will always be confronted with the problem of reconciling
the purpose of that constitution with the present purposes of the Nation, govern-
ment and populace. If one is to accept some kind of constitutional polity one must
recognize the point of the constitution, written or unwritten, and attribute to it some
authority. Inherent in the notion of constitutionalism is the tenet that while the
constitution exists, is popularly accepted, and has legal force, the interpretations,
decisions or actions of the present generation should not be unfettered, or at least
not unaffected by, the principles and structures provided for in it. Given that the
U.S.A. and Australia both have written constitutions embodying a constrained
democratic majoritarianism, how are we to be constitutional and provide adequate-
ly for the needs, desires and interests of those currently interpreting and affected by
a constitution?
It is only possible here to briefly describe the theory that I argue provides the
best answer to this question and adequately accommodates historical analysis in
constitutional interpretation. I will use Australia as an illustration.' Professor Ri-
chard Fallon has argued that constitutional law suffers from a "commensurability
problem." Courts admit the relevance of a number of kinds of argument all of
which we have touched upon:
arguments from the plain, necessary or historical meaning of the constitu-
tional text; arguments about the intent of the framers; arguments of con-
stitutional theory that reason from the hypothesized purposes that best
explain either particular constitutional provisions or the constitutional text
as a whole; arguments based on judicial precedent and value arguments
that assert claims about justice or social policy."
Since courts must come to a single legal decision in cases before them, the
commensurability problem is "to show how arguments of all these various kinds fit
together in a single, coherent constitutional calculus."' It is contended that each
kind of argument has its part to play and can be reconciled with the other, even if
we sometimes must rank the kinds of argument hierarchically. Tentatively, my
ranking would give priority to fundamental principles derived from the whole text
87Id.. at 32, 39.
" Although I will not argue it fully here, I see no major impediments to the application of my theory to the
U.S.A. for a recent critique of originalism in the U.S. (advocating "democratic sovereignty": in constitu-
tional interpretation) see S. Freeman, Original meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the Constitution,
2191 PHiu AN Pua.Ars. 3-42 (Winter 1992).
" R.H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 100 HRv. r. REv.
1189,1189-90 (April 1987).
90 Id. at 1190.
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of the Constitution when consistent with the nature of the polity it constitutes; and
then, in order of decreasing importance, particular provisions of the text, framers'
intent, precedent and the judges' moral and policy values. But, of course, the val-
ues of the interpreters will have a pervasive, if not explicit, impact on the treatment
of each kind of argument. This article concurs with Professor Fallon, however,
when he argues that this type of ranking should only come into play if the effort to
achieve coherence does not succeed." Professor Fallon summarizes his theory in
the following way:
The "constructivist coherence theory" that I offer has two main aspects.
The first asserts that the implicit norms of our constitutional practice call
for a constitutional interpreter to assess and reassess the arguments in the
various categories in an effort to understand each of the relevant factors as
prescribing the same result ...Typically, legal arguments - including
those of a judicial and even Supreme Court opinions - find the best argu-
ments in all of the categories to support, or at least not to be inconsistent
with, a single result ... The various kinds of constitutional argument are
substantially interrelated and interdependent. Reciprocal influences
among them make it possible most of the time to achieve constructivist
coherence. The role of value arguments is especially important in this re-
spect...
The second element of my theory comes into play only when the effort to
achieve coherence does not succeed. In such cases, the categories of argu-
ment are assigned a hierarchical order in which the highest ranked factor
clearly requiring an outcome prevails over lower ranked factors.'
According to this theory, judges must try to balance fairly the various antino-
mies that arise in considering the different kinds of argument: for example, original
understanding versus authoritative current meaning; ordinary language versus
"constitutional" language (for example, "due process" in American Constitutional
law); and principles versus counterprinciples embodied in the Constitution. A suit-
ably modified constructivist coherence theory of constitutional interpretation could,
and, it is argued, should, operate in Australia with the fundamental principles of the
Constitution governing over other kinds of argument.
The theory I propose may be called a text-constrained, but democratic and
constitutionalist theory of constitutional interpretation. Its main outlines can be
described in a number of interlinked propositions concerning (1) the possibility of
democratic judicial review; (2) the judicial consideration of historical evidence; (3)
the status of the constitutional text; (4) implied constitutional principles; (5) the
Mischief Rule and general constitutional principles and structures; (6) the place of
judicial policy and value choices. We can now examine each of these elements in
turn.
(a) Possibility of democratic judicial review.
The High Court of Australia is clearly now the chief constitutional interpreter,
is not bound by stare decisis, has judicial review at its disposal and can admit a
range of evidence in constitutional cases.




This article accepts Lindell's 3 argument that courts in Australia, like English
courts at common law, have not only the authority, but the duty to exercise judicial
review in relation to legislative and executive acts. This duty applies equally to the
High Court of Australia in relation to the Constitutional text which is an Act of the
Imperial Parliament (but, as has been, argued throughout this article, this text is not
exhaustive of the constitution of Australian polity - constitutional principles,
structures and conventions, for instance, play a fundamental role).
Flowing from the common law and constitutional recognition in Australia of
the distinction between the exercise of judicial, executive and legislative powers,
and the principle of complete judicial independence, the High Court has and must
exercise where relevant its jurisdiction ('an authority to adjudicate" - per Isaacs,J. in Baxter's Case)94 to exclusively "apply, and interpret for themselves, the provi-
sions of the constitution." Since the Commonwealth and State Parliaments can
only legislate validly with respect to powers provided for or saved in the Common-
wealth Constitution, and because these powers are themselves subject to limitation
in its text, the duty of the High Court in judicial review of the Australian Constitu-
tion can be described in the following way:
The function of examining the constitutional validity of Commonwealth or
State legislation requires interpreting and determining
(a) the scope of the legislative powers and the restrictions on the exercise
of these powers contained in the Constitution; and
(b) whether the legislation can be characterized as either an exercise of
those powers [valid] or as falling within the restrictions placed on the ex-
ercise of these powers [invalid].'
The High Court has, at least, since Webb v. Outrim9' in fact "acted on the as-
sumption that they do possess the authority to review the constitutional validity of
Commonwealth or State legislation."" The fact that a constitutional case before the
High Court involves "political" questions provides no exemption to the Court from
its duty to exercise judicial review. Clearly, were such an exemption to apply to an
avowedly political document such as a constitution, this judicial power would be
rendered vacuous. In fact, however, no such exemption has been recognized by the
High Court despite the usual positivistic denials from some judges that they are
concerned only with legal questions and not political ones. Even the legalist Sir
Owen Dixon recognized that "[t]he Constitution is a political instrument. It deals
with government and governmental powers... It is not a question [in judicial re-
view] whether the considerations are political for nearly every consideration arising
from the constitution can be so described, but whether they are compelling."'
11 G. Lindell,Duty to Excercise Judicial~eview in L. ZnMs, Co rIavmmps oN Th CONsrMroN (Sydney:
Butterworths, 1977), ch.5.
"Baxter v. Conmmrs. of Taxation 4 C.LR. 1087 (1907), at 1142 quoted in Lindell, supra note 93, at 152,
n.8.
"Lindell, supra note 93, at 166.
"Id. relying on Victoria v. The Cth. 7 A.L.R. 277 (1975); the Engineer's case 9 28 C.L.R. 129 (1920);
James v. the Cth. 55 C.L.R. 1 (1936); n.94; Australian Railways Union v. Victorian Railways Commnas.
44 C.L.R. 319 (1933); Australian Assistance Plan case 7 A.L.R. 277 (1975).
97 [1907] A.C. 81, cited inId. at 175.
"Id. at 176.
Melbourne Corporation v. Cth. 74 C.LR. 31, 82 (1947), quoted in Detmold, supra note 5, at 5.
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Thus, the High Court has through judicial review the power to achieve a co-
herent constitutional interpretation which takes account of the range of constitu-
tional arguments identified by Professor Fallon, and gives precedence to
fundamental principles of the constitution assumed, implied, embodied or necessi-
tated by the Constitutional text.
We must now ask whether democratic judicial review by the High Court is
possible (I assume for reasons already given that it is desirable). Here it can be re-
iterated that originalists have a distorted view even of representative democracy;
that in Australia and the U.S. we have, at least formally, constitutional democracy;
and that there are more substantive formulations (and visions) of democracy than
mere representative democracy.
First, originalists describe representative democracy in terms of bare parlia-
mentary majoritarianism. This view is not accurate even with regard to the limited
political phenomena it seeks to describe. It ignores for instance, the questions of
how fair, regular and free elections are to be guaranteed. In relation to Australia,
especially, it neglects the doctrine of responsible cabinet government (following
the Westminster model and enshrined in § 64 of the Constitution) according to
which the Executive is accountable to Parliament, and Parliament, via elections, to
the people. It fails, also, to appreciate the role of an independent judiciary and ju-
dicial review in representative democracies (courts determining such decisive ques-
tions as, for instance, whether an Act of Parliament has even been passed). As was
said by the High Court (in The Queen v. Kirby; ex parte Boilermaker's Society of
Australia), this judicial power is essential to afederal polity:
The conception of independent governments [Commonwealth and State]
existing in the one area and exercising powers in different fields of action
carefully defined by law could not be carried into practical effect unless
the ultimate responsibility of deciding upon the limits of the respective
powers of the governments were placed in the federal judicature."°
Second, the Austalian (and American) polities are not merely representative
democracies but constitutional democracies. The High Court, as we have seen, is
the chief interpreter, and also a keeper, of the written Constitution and constitution-
al principles which limit executive and legislative action. The Parliament of the
Commonwealth does not enjoy complete legislative sovereignty. Even if it did, the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a common law, judicial notion, not by
definition a parliamentary one. As Detmold has pointed out:
Thus if the ultimate constitutional rule in the United Kingdom legal sys-
tem is "whatever the Queen in parliament enacts is the law" it is so only
because the judges have held it to be so and continue to hold it... A sim-
ple way of expressing this constitutional state of affairs is to say that the
legal status of this ultimate rule is a common law matter." '
Third, there are more substantial theories of democracy than merely repre-
sentative ones. As Freeman has recently argued, there is a democratic social con-
tract tradition stretching from Locke, Rousseau and Kant to Rawls which maintains
that "democracy is not just a form of government; more elementally it is a kind of
sovereignty based in the equal freedom and independence of all citizens."" Al-
...94 C.L.R. 254,267-68 (1957), quoted in Lindell, supra note 93, at 185, n.8.
.. Detmold, supra note 5, at 229.
'02Freeman, supra note 5, at 5.
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though this proposition is no doubt more true of the U.S. Constitution enacted by
"We the People" than of the Australian Constitution text whose formal legal validi-
ty resides in an Imperial Act of Parliament, it does nevertheless have application to
Australian conditions. First, popular participation in the Federation movement and
in ratification of the Australian constitutional drafts, limited though it was, cannot
be discounted as a contribution to the legitimacy of the Australian Constitution.
Second, the constitution as enacted embodies and implies fundamental principles
concerning the separation of powers, judicial authority and independence, responsi-
ble government, representative democracy, federalism, political participation, and
individual rights. 103 Thirdly, the constitution as written text only constrains politi-
cal and legal practice while it is accepted by the Australian people. Since the pass-
ing of the Australia Acts (construed as simultaneously an exercise and abdication of
sovereign legislative power by.the U.K. Parliament in relation to Australia) it is
open to the people of Australia (unlikely as it is) to replace the current constitution
by means of the referendum procedure under § 128 without fear of being reversed
by the U.K. legislature (or it could create a nouvelle ordrejuridique by a republi-
can revolution as in the United States - I take no position here on the desirability
of such a course of action). Fourthly, the constitution of Australia is not limited to
the constitutional text but includes constitutional conventions, the effects of judi-
cial review, the principle of rule of law and the operation of common law princi-
ples.
Further, originalists cast a relatively keen and critical eye in relation to the ef-
ficiency and justice of the operation of the judiciary in relation to the Constitution,
but have their vision obscured by complacent cataracts when looking upon the
functioning of representative legislative democracy; blindly trusting "complete ma-
joritarianism'" as democratic. In fact, however, it is not clear that legislatures
will always operate more democratically than courts - what is needed is a separa-
tion and balance of powers, and a recognition (like John Stuart Mill's) that there
can be a popularly elected tyranny of the majority. As James Madison warned in
relation to the U.S.:
In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community,
and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from
acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts
in which Government is the mere instrument of the major number of its
constituents.'
Thus, again, Madison stressed that
[i]t is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard against the op-
pression of its rulers, but to guard one part of society against the injustice
of the other part... If a majority be united by a common interest, the
rights of the minority will be insecure.'0
Constitutionalist democracy concerns itself not merely with the representation of
the will of the majority in government but the rights of minorities against it.
l"See, e.g.Bailey supra note 67,( treatment of political, civil, legal, economic, egalitarian and social rights
in the Australian Constitution, in Ch. 4passim).
"'he phrase is Robert Bork's, cited in Freeman, supra note 4, at 5.
ILetter to Jefferson, 17 October 1788, quoted in W.F. Murphy et aL (1986), supra note 4, at 28.
1"6Federalist No. 51, quoted in Id. at 36. See also Federalist No. 10, quoted in Id. at 37.
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Indeed Mr. Justice Brennan, currently on the bench of the High Court of Aus-
tralia, has recently shown effectively that representative democracy is not working
in Australia as democratically as intended. The balance of power has swung deci-
sively in favour of the central executive government and the public bureaucracy,
political parties (and the Executive as the majority party) dominate Parliament, and
Parliament (with regard to initiation of legislation, fate of legislation, public de-
bate, control of finances) is controlled by the Executive instead of vice versa. Giv-
en this demise of representative democracy, Justice Brennan argues forcefully that
the equalizing, democratizing role of judicial review in constitutional interpretation
is more vital than ever to the health of the Australian polity. It is worth quoting
from his argument at length:
This is a more realistic view of [representative] democracy in our time, but
it calls for a reappraisal of our constitutional safeguards of freedom. As
the wind of political expediency now chills Parliament's willingness to
impose checks on the Executive and the Executive now has a large mea-
sure of control over legislation, the courts alone retain their original func-
tion of standing between government and the governed...
The checks imposed by the courts on the actions of the political branches
of governments have been seen by some as anti-democratic, for the judges
are not elected by the people. That view misconceives what is involved in
the exercise of judicial power. The courts do not seek to interfere with
lawful policy: that is the proper domain of the political branches. But the
courts are concerned to subject the political branches of government to the
rule of law, for that is the constitutional imperative which binds all
branches of government. It can hardly be anti-democratic to restrain Par-
liament to its constitutional power, nor to constrain the Executive to con-
form to the Constitution and the laws enacted by Parliament. '
(2) The judicial consideration of historical evidence.
There is no reason why the High Court should not consider historical evidence,
including the framers' intent (as far as it can ever be determined) in constitutional
cases; providing that is does not take the originalist approach"re that the framers'
intentions are somehow binding and determinative of its decision.
7 Brennan, .; supra note 2, at 35, 36-37, n.2.
'"'The dangers of an originalist approach to historical materials combined with narrow legalism were dem-
onstrated in the recent Incorporation case (N.S.W. v. the Cth. 169 C.L.Th 482 (1990)) in which the High
Court made its first explicit and significant use of the Convention Debates. The majority held that the
Commonwealth lacked the power under § 51 (xx) of the Constitution to legislate in relation to the Incor-
poration of training and financial corporations; frustrating the Commonwealth government's legislation
for a uniform, national companies and securities code. The majority combined a literalness in interpreting
the word "formed" in placitum (xx) ("Foreign corporations and trading or financial corporationsformed
within the limits of the Commonwealth" (emphasis added)) as meaning "which have been or shall have
been created" (at 498), precedent (principally, the previously disdained decision of the Court in Huddart,
Parkers & Co., Pty. Ltd. v. Moorehead 8 C.L.R. 330 (1909).) and history in coming to its conclusion. The
rule now seems to be that "the Convention Debates may be used to establish the subject to which the para-
graph [(xx)] was directed" (id. at 501;following Cole v. Whitfield 165 C.L..L 360, 385 (1988), Port Mac.
Donnell Professional Fishermen's Association Inc. v. South Australia 168 C.L.R. 340, 375-77 (1988)).
The majority's consideration of the legislative history of § 51 (xx) led it to conclude that it was "con-
cemed with existing corporations and was not intended to confer power to legislate for their creation" (at
501). Deane, ., dissenting, rejected the literal construction of the word "formed" as "unacceptably narrow
and technical" (at 512) and, even more strongly, the original intent analysis employed by the majority:
"The answer.., must, of course, be found in the words of the Constitution. It is those words - and those
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It has already been demonstrated that despite its protestations against consult-
ing the Convention Debates, the High Court has and continues to engage in histori-
cal analysis and to rely, at least indirectly, on the evidence of those Debates. I
follow Chief Justice Mason in arguing that even "[o]ne speaker [in the Debates]
may provide an unexpected insight or explain why a particular draft was not accep-
ted."'" Thus, despite the admitted defects of judges as historians, the consultation
of historical evidence is a legitimate part of the High Court's ex post facto judicial
law-making in the common law tradition, (indeed, according to Detmold, "the con-
stitution can hardly be interpreted without an understanding of the historical facts
of federation, the main sources for which must clearly include the Convention De-
bates")' As Freeman has argued in relation to the U.S. Constitution, the court can
take account of and even be persuaded by the reasons given by the Framers for cer-
tain interpretations of the constitution; what it must not do, however, is to regard
these reasons as authoritative:
the framers' writings on the constitution are of significance in establishing
a sense of continuity and tradition especially instrumental to democratic
education. We might even look to the framers for advice as one source
among others. But to assign to the framers' thoughts and intentions advi-
sory or educational significance is not the same as to make them binding
and dispositive of constitutional meanings. Their intentions cannot
obligate us or settle anything...
To defer to their intentions because they initiated the constitution, or for
whatever reason, is to forfeit democratic for ancestral sovereignty. This
does not mean that we cannot be influenced by the reasons the founders
had for constitutional provisions; but when we are, it cannot be because
words alone -which constitute the compact made between the people of this country when, by referen-
da, they authorized the formal enactment of- or, in the case of the people of Western Australia, the proc-
lamation of adherence to - the terms upon which they "agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal
Commonwealth." If the words of§ 51 (xx), construed in context in accordance with settled principle, ex-
tend to authorize the making of such laws, it is simply not to the point that some one or more of the chang-
ing participants in Convention Committees or Debates or some parliamentarian, civil servant or draftsman
on another side of the world intended or understood that the words of the national compact would bear
some different or narrower meaning". (At 503-504 emphasis added. See also: 511) (following Breaving-
ton v. Golleman 169 C.L.R. 41, at 131-33 (1988)). He also referred to, but did not flesh out, "the advan-
tages of such national companies legislation", the subject of challenge by the States in this case, which to
him seemed "overwhelmingly to outweigh the alleged inconvenience" (Id. at 512). The case demonstrates
that the resort to historical evidence by judges or their resistance to it does not allow one to infer from this
fact the likely ideological character of the interpretation given to a constitution (Dean, ., for example,
purported to rely solely on the words of the Constitution and yet, arguably, imported into hisjudgment
more explicitly political notions like "compacts" among people). See further, J.G. Starke, (Current Top-
ics), A Severe Limit on the Commonwealth's Corporations Power, 64 Aust LJ. 235 (May 1990) ; R.
McQueen, Why High Court Judges Make Poor Historians: The Corporations Act case and Early Attempts
to Establish a National System of Company Regulation in Australia 19 F9n. L REy. 245 (1990), at
245-246, 264-265; G. Kennett, Constitutional Interpretation in the Corporates Case, 19 Fan. L. Ray. 223
(1990). We must always remember, as Professor Fallon notes, that
Far from being a simple fact awaiting discovery by the industrious researcher, the framers' intent
must be viewed as an intellectual construct, developed through a process of interpretation, that
seeks to embody the principles that furnish the best political justification for a constitutional provi-
sion and that find substantial support in the political climate surrounding the provision's framing
and adoption
(footnotes omitted) - supra note 89, at 1212-1213. Cf E.H. Carr's discussion of historical "facts" in
WHATisHsroRy? (Ringwood, Vic., Penguin Books Australia, 1964), Ch. 1.
1091d. n.2.
"'Detmold, supra note 5, at 233.
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they held them, but because these considerations impress us as good rea-
sons anyone could accept in his or her capacity as equal citizens.",
(3) The status of the constitutional text.
There is a written constitutional text in Australia and the United States which,
while it is accepted by the polity, the constitutional court is bound to try to under-
stand; respecting that the Constitution restrains its decision,"' but is in many cases
open-textured. This is so especially in the U.S.A., but is certainly applicable to
Australia.113
More fundamentally, the text is not all that there is to the "political constitu-
tion of any regime." As Freeman emphasizes:
There is... a sense of the term "constitution" that designates an institu-
tion, and that must be presupposed by any written constitution. In its in-
stitutional sense, the political constitution of any regime is that system of
publicly recognized and commonly accepted rules for making and apply-
ing those social rules that are laws... the text has been [in Supreme Court
judicial review] but one aspect of an ongoing process of interpretation, an
activity that goes on in any regime, with or without the assistance of a
written constitution [consider, for example constitutional interpretation in
England]. The Court constantly, reorchestrates precedents and extends
principles to develop new meanings for constitutional provisions.""
We have seen that Freeman's description would apply also to the practice of the
High Court.
(4) Implied constitutional principles
Within a common law and constitutionalist tradition, and despite frequent de-
nials, the High Court, as this article has demonstrated, already construes the Con-
stitutional text in the light of constitutional principles thought to be implied by it,
and according to the perceived requirements of rule of law.
As Justice recently declared:
In the long history of the common law,-some values have been recognized
as the enduring values of a free society and they are the values which in-
form the development of the common law and help to mould the meanings
of statutes. These values include the dignity and integrity of every person,
substantive equality before the law, the absence of unjustified discrimina-
tion, the peaceful possession of one's property, the benefit of natural jus-
tice, and immunity from retrospective [that is legislation must be
"'Freeman, supra note 4, at 28. See also, Detmold, supra note 5, at 230-238, on the role of reasons in the
judicial process.
"'Much of the plain language of the text is taken for granted but, as Fallon argues, "arguments from the
text achieve the... nontrivial result of excluding one or more positions that might be argued for an non.
textual grounds" Fallon, (1987) supra note 89, at 1196. Clearly much of the rationale behind written con-
stitutions is to entrench certain features of a polity and put them - at least at a certain level of abstraction
-beyond interpretive challenge: a rock of "writtenness" in a sea of interpretive possibilities.30n the U.S.A. see Fallon (1987), supra note 89. For Australia, consider the language in the following
sections of the Commonwealth Constitution: § 51 (ii) ("discriminate"), (xxxix) ("External affairs"), (xxxi)
("just terms"), (xxxix) ("matters incidental to the execution of any power..."); § 52 "laws for the peace,
order and good government of the Commonwealth":); § 92 ("absolutely free"); § 109 ("inconsistent"); §
118 ("Full faith and credit..."); § 116 ("free exercise of any religion").
"'Freeman, supra note 4, at 6-7.
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prospective although, as we have noted, its interpretation by courts is un-
avoidably ex postfacto] and unreasonable operation of laws."'
(5) The "Mischief Rule" and general principles and structures.
It would be a relatively small step from the Court's use of the Mischief Rule to
then refer to historical evidence to help discern in the text (original intent not being
decisive in interpretation) those general principles and structures designed by the
Framers which bound legitimate constitutional interpretation - such as representa-
tive democracy - whatever the specific content attributed to them by the Court at
any particular time This builds on the Court's connotation/denotation distinction,
and is consistent with Dworkin's distinction between 'concepts ' and "conceptions"
developed in his Law's Empire."6
(6) The place ofjudicial policy and value choices.
Finally, in construing the broad constitutional principles and structures that
have been referred to, judges must be candid about policy and value choices being
made, hear argument on all sides (the equitable notion of audi alterampartem), and
make an assessment based on their perception (as it must be) of current community
vales."
7
The construction of a community's values by legal elites (as judges of the U.S.
Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia"8 admittedly are) is a contestable
project because it can be argued that there are multi-layered and divergent norma-
tive orders in the U.S.A. and Australia (particularly as both are multicultural poli-
ties) that they would be unlikely to reflect. Nevertheless, it is submitted that even
the commitment of judges to their own (possibly) narrow conception of community
values is indispensable to democratic rule of law. As Professor Fallon emphasizes,
the data of the community's morality
will not be wholly without constraining force; appeal to the community's
values is more than a charade through which a judge imposes her immedi-
ate moral views... interpretive efforts to identify the community's moral-
ity are required by a constitutional practice that welcomes the infusion of
value arguments into our constitutional law yet retains an ideal of the judi-
cial office in some sense representing the whole people.""
Irrespective of the content attributed by a judge to the interpretive vessel
"community values," then, as long as she is genuine in her attempt to derive them,
there is a benefit in terms of judicial neutrality. If she is candid about those values,
judicial accountability is increased: the values are placed before a public forum and
must withstand critical appraisal (if only the glare of legal and other academia, the
profession or the media).' Further, legislation can be initiated to correct judicial
distortions (although admittedly its interpretation will still lie in the courts).
"sBrennan, supra note 2, at 40.
"6Dwomcm (1986), supra note 19, at 90-96.
"'See Mason (1986), supra note 1, at 23-28; Failon (1987), supra note 89, at 1249, 1263; Dworkin
(1990), supra note 25.
"'See e.g. M. SmTON, etaL, THE LaEAL MYSrQt TIIHE RoLB OF IAWYERs INAusnWLIAN SocisY (Melbourne:
Angus and Robertson, 1982).
"'Id. n.297.
'201 have not here been able to take account of Stephen Gardbaum's comprehensive treatment of Law
Politics ad the Claims of Community, 90 M!cHL. Rev. 685-760 (February 1992).
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This article has sought to demonstrate by comparative analysis the impractical-
ity, inconsistency and normative unattractiveness of originalism as an approach to
constitutional interpretation in Australia and the United States. Nevertheless, I
have maintained that this conclusion does not preclude the judicial consideration of
historical evidence as long as that evidence is not regarded by the judge as binding
upon her constitutional interpretation. Finally, the article outlined a text-
constrained, but democratic and constitutionalist theory of constitutional inter-
pretation; suggesting its merit and showing its "fir' with existing High Court con-
stitutional interpretation. Thus, history can play its part in elucidating the
fundamentals of the written document constituting the polity we have, but it would
not be decisive. With this approach to historical evidence, and a community-based
model of constitutional interpretation in place, we can have some confidence in
both countries, as does Dworkin in the U.S.A, that "democracy and constitutional
constraint are not antagonists but partners in principle....
121Dworkin (1990), supra note 25, at 346.
VOL. XI[

